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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Most litigants involved in lawsuits in the United States are re-
sponsible for the cost of their own attorney’s fees.1 However, because 
Congress believed that certain types of claims, including employment 
discrimination and other civil rights claims, are important enough to 
encourage potential plaintiffs and their attorneys to pursue these ac-
tions, it enacted several fee-shifting statutes.2 These statutes provide 
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 1. Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Factors or Conditions in Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases Said to Justify Decrease in Attorneys’ Fees Awarded Under § 706(k) of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k)), 151 A.L.R. FED. 77, 121 (1999). The rule that 
requires parties to pay their own attorney’s fees is known as the “American rule,” which 
contrasts with the way attorney’s fees are handled in England, where the losing party is 
responsible for both sides’ attorney’s fees. Id.
 2. Some of these fee-shifting statutes include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12205 (2006); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) 
(2006); and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) 
(2006). The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 was enacted after the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 
(1975), where the Court determined that a prevailing civil rights plaintiff was not entitled 
to an award of attorney’s fees. The statute’s purpose was to effectively overturn Alyeska 
Pipeline. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 118 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
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that the prevailing party may recover a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
While these statutes typically do not exclude prevailing defendants 
from recovering their attorney’s fees, usually only prevailing plain-
tiffs are entitled to recover what can sometimes be a significant 
amount.3 However, a problem with these statutes occurs when a 
plaintiff is able to prove that a defendant violated his rights but is 
then awarded only nominal damages. In most of these cases, courts 
have denied these plaintiffs’ requests for attorney’s fees, despite the 
fact that they were prevailing parties.4 This Article will argue that 
the Supreme Court should revisit this issue and conclude that in em-
ployment discrimination and other civil rights cases where plaintiffs 
are awarded only nominal damages, such plaintiffs, as prevailing 
parties, should typically be awarded attorney’s fees.  
 As noted above, most successful employment discrimination plain-
tiffs who recover more than nominal damages are entitled to an 
award of attorney’s fees from their former, or sometimes current, 
employer.5 The fee-shifting statute that allows these awards depends 
on the employment discrimination statute under which the plaintiff 
prevails. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act has its 
own fee-shifting provision;6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(as amended) has its own fee-shifting provision;7 and the Age Dis-
                                                                                                                    
 3. See infra notes 5-9; see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 421 (1978) (noting that a prevailing Title VII 
plaintiff is usually entitled to recover his attorney’s fees but that a prevailing defendant is 
entitled to recover attorney’s fees only when “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreason-
able, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith”). 
 4. See infra Part III; see also Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 (holding that civil rights plain-
tiffs who win nominal damages are prevailing parties but are usually not entitled to an 
award of attorney’s fees). 
 5. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, plaintiffs who 
win other types of civil rights cases, many of which this Article will discuss,  are also eligi-
ble for an award of attorney’s fees. Specifically, that statutory provision provides that “[i]n 
any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, 
and 1986 of this title . . . [or] title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . the court, in its dis-
cretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 6. The fee-shifting provision for the Americans with Disabilities Act states the fol-
lowing: “In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, 
the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable at-
torney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable 
for the foregoing the same as a private individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. 
 7. The fee-shifting provision for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states the 
following: “In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as 
part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the 
same as a private person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Although the statute does not specifi-
cally state that there is a different standard for prevailing plaintiffs than there is for pre-
vailing defendants, almost all prevailing plaintiffs who receive more than nominal dam-
ages are awarded attorney’s fees under this and other fee-shifting statutes, while prevail-
ing defendants typically do not recover fees unless the plaintiff’s suit was frivolous. See 
Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 417, 421 (noting that a prevailing defendant is 
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crimination in Employment Act also has its own fee-shifting provi-
sion.8 In the non-employment discrimination context, the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides that plaintiffs who pre-
vail in other civil rights claims are entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorney’s fee.9 The one common thread running through these fee-
shifting statutes is that the fee must be “reasonable.”10
 One issue courts wrestled with prior to 1992 was whether a plain-
tiff who demonstrates that a defendant violated his rights but is 
awarded only nominal damages is entitled to recover his attorney’s 
fees.11 In its 1992 Farrar v. Hobby decision, the Supreme Court de-
termined that plaintiffs who win only nominal damages—while tech-
                                                                                                                    
entitled to recover attorney’s fees in a Title VII case when the plaintiff’s action was “frivol-
ous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad 
faith.”). 
 8. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s fee-shifting provision is found at 29 
U.S.C. § 626(b), which incorporates the attorney’s fees provision from the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, which states: “The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment 
awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the de-
fendant, and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). In this fee-shifting statute, 
Congress used the word “shall” rather than “may” when addressing whether courts should 
award attorney’s fees. Also, this provision focuses its attention on prevailing plaintiffs, not 
prevailing parties.  
 9. As noted previously, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides 
that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title . . . [or] title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 10. Courts are consistent in concluding that there is a two-step process used to de-
termine what fee is “reasonable.” Jimenez v. Paw-Paw’s Camper City, Inc., No. 00-1756 
Section “N” (2), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3248, at *53-54 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2002). The first 
step involves a determination of the “lodestar” amount. Id. at *53. This amount “is calcu-
lated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by an appropriate hourly 
rate . . . .” Id. After making this determination, the court has the authority to either in-
crease or decrease this amount based on the twelve factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit in 
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit 
set out the following twelve factors in Johnson:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of 
other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the cus-
tomary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations im-
posed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results 
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the 
‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional rela-
tionship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 
488 F.2d at 717-19. 
 11.  As will be discussed in this Article, most plaintiffs who win only nominal damag-
es rarely receive attorney’s fees (if they do, those awards are usually drastically reduced). 
See infra Part III. Nonetheless, if a plaintiff fails to request these nominal damages, he 
might foreclose the opportunity for the court to even consider an attorney’s fee award. See 
Azimi v. Jordan’s Meats, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D. Me. 2007), aff’d, 456 F.3d 228 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (denying a request for attorney’s fees when the plaintiff won only declaratory re-
lief and failed to make a timely request for an award of nominal damages). 
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nically prevailing parties—are only eligible for these fee awards and 
will likely not be entitled to them.12 Although Justice Thomas wrote 
the Court’s opinion in Farrar, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion 
has become the more influential opinion when subsequent courts 
have had to decide whether to award attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who 
have won only nominal damages.13
 Since the Farrar opinion, most courts have determined that plain-
tiffs who receive only nominal damages are not entitled to attorney’s 
fees.14 In applying the three-factor test from Justice O’Connor’s opi-
nion, courts consider: (1) the difference between the amount awarded 
and the amount sought; (2) the significance of the legal issue on 
which the plaintiff prevailed; and (3) whether the litigation accom-
plished a “public goal other than occupying the time and energy of 
counsel, court, and client.”15
 Although most courts seem to disfavor an award of attorney’s fees 
in cases in which plaintiffs are awarded only nominal damages, this 
outcome undermines the goals of the fee-shifting statutes and deters 
individuals from attempting to enforce their rights. This Article will 
argue that plaintiffs who win only nominal damages should, as pre-
vailing parties, generally be entitled to recover their attorney’s fees. 
The Article will explain why the three factors Justice O’Connor arti-
culated in her concurring opinion in Farrar should not be used to de-
termine whether these plaintiffs should recover their attorney’s fees. 
Additionally, the Article will argue that, because of the current rules 
used to determine the propriety of awarding attorney’s fees, victims 
of civil rights violations and their attorneys will be unlikely to pursue 
meritorious, but perhaps not lucrative, claims; employers and gov-
ernment officials might be less likely to vigilantly police their work 
environments and employees’ behavior; and plaintiffs will no longer 
have any incentive to act as “private attorneys general,” which the 
Supreme Court suggested victims of employment discrimination 
should do.16 As a result, the Court should revisit Farrar and decide 
that plaintiffs who demonstrate violations of their rights should be 
                                                                                                                    
 12. 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992). 
 13. See infra Parts III, IV, and V. 
 14. This is most likely because of Justice Thomas’s statement that “[w]hen a plaintiff 
recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his 
claim for monetary relief . . . the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 
U.S. at 115 (citation omitted). See infra Part III for a discussion of several of these cases 
where plaintiffs who were able to prove civil rights violations were not able to recover at-
torney’s fees. 
 15. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 120-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 16. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (citing Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968)). In Albemarle Paper Co., the Supreme Court 
noted that in the employment discrimination context, employees should act as “private at-
torneys general” when trying to enforce the substantive provisions of Title VII. Id.
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entitled to recover the attorney’s fees incurred as a result of pursuing 
these meritorious claims. 
 The Article will first discuss the Court’s Farrar opinion and Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurring opinion from that case.17 Next, the Article 
will provide numerous examples of cases where plaintiffs who re-
ceived awards of only nominal damages were denied attorney’s fees 
or were awarded almost no attorney’s fees.18 Then, the Article will 
examine some rare cases in which plaintiffs who won only nominal 
damages were successful in recovering their attorney’s fees, either in 
whole or in significant part.19 Thereafter, the Article will discuss cas-
es where victorious plaintiffs recovered a modest percentage of what 
they sought in attorney’s fees.20 Finally, I will argue that in order to 
further the purposes behind civil rights fee-shifting provisions, the 
Court should revisit Farrar and decide that prevailing parties who 
receive only nominal damages should usually be entitled to recover 
their attorney’s fees, regardless of the amount of damages sought, the 
legal significance of the issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, or 
whether the litigation served some public purpose.21
II.   THE FARRAR V. HOBBY OPINION
 The Supreme Court addressed two issues in Farrar. The first is-
sue was whether a plaintiff who secures only a nominal-damage 
award in a civil rights action is a prevailing party for purposes of the 
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,22 and the second 
was whether such a plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s 
fees.23 While the Court determined that a nominal-damage award 
does render a plaintiff in such a case a prevailing party,24 the Court 
also determined that such status does not necessarily entitle that 
party to an award of attorney’s fees.25 In fact, the Court suggested 
that the plaintiffs in most of these cases would not be entitled to an 
award of attorney’s fees.26 Although the Farrar facts perhaps justified 
Justice Thomas’s and Justice O’Connor’s opinions, the Farrar facts 
were so extreme and so different from the facts of most civil rights 
                                                                                                                    
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. See infra Part VI. 
 22. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 105 (1992); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
 23. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 105.  
 24. Id. at 113-14. 
 25. Id. at 115-16. 
 26. See id. at 115. This contradicts the usual rule in employment discrimination cas-
es, where prevailing employment discrimination plaintiffs are usually entitled to attorney’s 
fees. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 
U.S. 412, 417 (1978). 
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claims that applying the Farrar reasoning is inappropriate in most 
cases. Applying Farrar to other civil rights claims has, and will con-
tinue to have, many negative consequences.27
Farrar was not an employment discrimination case.28 Rather, Far-
rar involved two plaintiffs who sued several defendants for a total of 
$17 million, alleging procedural due process violations after the State 
of Texas closed a school for delinquent, disabled, and disturbed teens 
after the death of one of its students.29 The jury decided that there 
were, in fact, violations of one plaintiff’s rights, but it also concluded 
that the violations were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s in-
juries.30 As a result of the jury’s verdict, the trial court ordered that 
the plaintiffs take nothing on their complaint, the action be dis-
missed, and the parties bear their own costs.31 On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.32 Most relevant for 
purposes of this Article, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the 
jury found that one of the defendants violated the civil rights of one 
of the plaintiffs, a judgment against that defendant and an order 
granting nominal damages to the plaintiff were appropriate.33 Both 
plaintiffs then sought an award of attorney’s fees and costs, which 
the district court granted in an amount close to $320,000.34 Once 
again on appeal in the Fifth Circuit, the court reversed the fee 
award.35 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were not prevailing 
parties because of the limited success they achieved in receiving  
just one dollar after seeking $17 million.36 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.37
 The Court revisited three previous cases in which the issue of pre-
vailing party status was at issue38 and ultimately concluded that in 
order to obtain prevailing party status, “a civil rights plaintiff must 
obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff 
must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from 
                                                                                                                    
 27.  Although I argue that the Court should revisit Farrar, another way courts can 
still award attorney’s fees to civil rights plaintiffs who win only nominal damages is by 
simply distinguishing the extreme facts in Farrar from the facts of the cases before them. 
28. 506 U.S. at 105-06. 
 29. Id.
 30. Id. at 106. 
 31. Id. at 106-07. 
 32. Id. at 107. The opinion from the Fifth Circuit can be found at Farrar v. Cain, 756 
F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985). In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit determined that an award of 
nominal damages was appropriate. Id. at 1152.   
 33. Id.
 34. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 107. 
 35. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 36. Id. at 1315. 
 37. Farrar v. Hobby, 502 U.S. 1090 (1992). 
 38. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 109-10 (relying on Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988) (per curiam); and 
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987)).  
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whom fees are sought or comparable relief through a consent decree 
or settlement.”39 The Court noted that “[w]hatever relief the plaintiff 
secures must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or set-
tlement.”40 In wrapping up its analysis, the Court concluded that “a 
plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim mate-
rially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying 
the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plain-
tiff.”41 The Court reasoned that, because judgments for both compensa-
tory and nominal damages affect the defendant’s behavior for the 
plaintiff’s benefit, a civil rights plaintiff who secures an award of only 
nominal damages is still a prevailing party for purposes of the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.42 The Court therefore con-
cluded that the Fifth Circuit was wrong when it decided that a plain-
tiff who recovers only nominal damages is not a prevailing party.43
 After deciding that the amount of the award a civil rights plaintiff 
wins is not the critical factor in determining whether he is a prevail-
ing party, the Court addressed how that amount can factor into the 
determination of whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate.44
The Court, seemingly being a bit dismissive of the importance of an 
individual’s civil rights, noted that in this particular case, the “litiga-
tion accomplished little beyond giving petitioners ‘the moral satisfac-
tion of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their] rights had 
been violated’ in some unspecified way.”45 The Court then noted that 
when the purpose of the litigation is to recover damages, and the 
plaintiff is unsuccessful in doing so, the primary consideration in de-
termining the appropriate amount of fees is the difference between 
the amount of damages sought and the amount ultimately recov-
ered.46 In Farrar, the plaintiffs requested $17 million in damages 
from several defendants yet received only one dollar from one of 
those defendants.47 The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment 
regarding the denial of a fee award, holding that “[w]hen a plaintiff 
recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an es-
sential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable 
fee is usually no fee at all.”48
                                                                                                                    
 39. Id. at 111 (citation omitted). 
 40. Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 764 (1987)). 
 41. Id. at 111-12. 
 42. Id. at 112-13. 
 43. Id. at 113. 
 44. Id. at 113-15. 
 45. Id. at 114 (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 762). 
 46. Id. (citing Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 585 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 47. Id. at 107. 
 48. Id. at 115-16. Again, the opposite rule typically applies in the employment dis-
crimination context when the plaintiff prevails—he is usually entitled to an attorney’s fee 
award. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 
U.S. 412, 417 (1978). 
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 Although Justice Thomas’s opinion addressed this issue in full, 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion has received the most atten-
tion in cases regarding nominal damages and attorney’s fees.49 In her 
opinion, Justice O’Connor first noted that “a technical victory may be 
so insignificant” that an award of attorney’s fees is not appropriate.50
After that observation, she found that the plaintiffs in Farrar “asked 
for a bundle and got a pittance.”51 As a result, she concluded that the 
plaintiffs’ recovery was de minimis.52 However, to make sure that 
courts did not interpret her words to mean that attorney’s fees are 
never appropriate in nominal-damage cases, she recognized that not 
all nominal-damage awards are de minimis and that “[n]ominal relief 
does not necessarily a nominal victory make.”53 She also noted that 
not all civil rights cases involve a lot of money and that plaintiffs 
should not be discouraged from acting as private attorneys general in 
enforcing these rights.54
 She also articulated a three-factor test to use when determining 
whether courts should award fees in nominal-damage cases.55 The 
factors Justice O’Connor set out were: (1) the difference between the 
damages sought and the damages awarded;56 (2) “the significance of 
the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed”;57 and 
                                                                                                                    
 49. See infra Parts III, IV, and V. 
 50. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 117 (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)). 
 51. Id. at 120. 
 52. Id. at 120-21. 
 53. Id. at 121. 
 54. Id. at 122. 
 55. Id. at 120-22. 
 56. Id. at 120-21. Justice Thomas also noted that this factor is the most important 
factor to evaluate when deciding what a reasonable attorney’s fee would be in a case where 
only nominal damages are awarded. Id. at 114. 
 57. Id. at 121. There is a split of authority with respect to what this factor actually 
evaluates. Some courts interpret this factor as meaning the extent to which the plaintiff 
succeeded on his theory of liability. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 
1997). Other courts interpret this factor as meaning the importance of the legal issue in-
volved. See Piper v. Oliver, 69 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 1995). Of course, courts that follow 
the Piper line of reasoning might be combining the second and third O’Connor factors. In 
fact, the court in Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc. noted that the second O’Connor factor 
was more likely meant to evaluate the extent to which the plaintiff prevailed on his claims 
at trial. 254 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001). The court used Justice O’Connor’s applica-
tion of the second factor in Farrar to reach this conclusion. Specifically, the court in Barber
noted that when addressing the second factor, Justice O’Connor wrote the following, sug-
gesting that the second factor should evaluate the extent to which the plaintiff prevailed in 
his claims: 
[the plaintiff] cannot be said to have achieved a true victory. Respondent was 
just one of six defendants and the only one not found to have engaged in a con-
spiracy. If recovering one dollar from the least culpable defendant and nothing 
from the rest legitimately can be labeled a victory—and I doubt that it can—
surely it is a hollow one. [The plaintiff] may have won a point, but the game, 
set, and match all went to the defendants. 
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(3) whether the litigation served some public purpose.58 After apply-
ing these factors to the facts before the Court, Justice O’Connor 
agreed that the proper fee for the plaintiff in Farrar was “nothing.”59
 Therefore, as a result of Justice Thomas’s and Justice O’Connor’s 
opinions in Farrar, the Court clarified a few points. First, an award 
of nominal damages gives a civil rights plaintiff prevailing party sta-
tus.60 Second, in the usual case in which only nominal damages are 
awarded, the appropriate attorney’s fee award should be no fee at 
all.61 Finally, when analyzing claims under various civil rights sta-
tutes, a three-factor test is appropriate to determine whether a plain-
tiff who recovers only nominal damages is an exception to the general 
rule and entitled to a full or substantial amount of the attorney’s fees 
requested.62 The next Part of this Article will provide several exam-
ples of when courts followed what the Farrar court described as the 
“usual” case—a case where a plaintiff who receives only nominal 
damages receives either no attorney’s fee award or one so insignifi-
cant that it is essentially no fee at all. 
III.   CASES WHERE COURTS DENIED FEES OR AWARDED EXTREMELY
LIMITED FEES
 As the Court clarified in Farrar, most plaintiffs who recover only 
nominal damages in employment discrimination and other civil 
rights cases will typically not be entitled to an award of attorney’s 
fees.63 Most courts follow this rule and deny fee requests to these 
plaintiffs who, despite being able to establish prevailing party status, 
are unsuccessful in convincing the court that the three O’Connor fac-
tors from Farrar weigh in favor of a fee award. 
 One case that thoroughly analyzed the O’Connor factors from Far-
rar is Petrunich v. Sun Building Systems, Inc.,64 a case brought under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and the equiva-
lent state antidiscrimination statute.65 In Petrunich, the court 
granted the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on the issue of li-
                                                                                                                    
Barber, 254 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 58. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121-22. 
 59. Id. at 122. Farrar was the perfect case to limit a plaintiff’s attorney’s fee award. 
Not only did Farrar involve an individual’s business interests rather than other, more per-
sonal interests, the plaintiff in Farrar sought an outrageous amount of damages and also 
continued the litigation for close to a decade. Id. at 105-09. 
 60. Id. at 105, 111-12. 
 61. Id. at 115. 
 62. See infra Parts III, IV, and V. 
 63. 506 U.S. at 115. 
 64. 625 F. Supp. 2d 199 (M.D. Pa. 2008), vacated by consent of the parties, No. 04-
2234, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104154 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2008). 
 65. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 can be found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
621-634 (2006). The equivalent state statute under which the plaintiff brought her claim 
was the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963 (West 2008). 
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ability,66 but a jury trial resulted in an award of no damages.67 The 
court then granted the plaintiff a nominal-damage award in the 
amount of one dollar.68
 After first determining that the plaintiff was a prevailing party 
under the Farrar standard,69 the court addressed what amount of at-
torney’s fees, if any, was appropriate.70 In making this determination, 
the court observed that under Farrar, when a plaintiff receives only 
nominal damages, the appropriate fee is “usually no fee at all.”71
However, after making this statement, the court used the three 
O’Connor factors and first considered the difference between what 
the plaintiff sought and what the plaintiff received.72 The court noted 
that the plaintiff sought approximately $150,000 in damages, yet he 
received only one dollar in nominal damages.73 As a result of this 
large difference, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s victory was 
essentially technical, or de minimis, and that this factor weighed 
against a fee award.74
 The court then focused on the second O’Connor factor—the signify-
cance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.75 After noting 
that the courts have disagreed on what exactly this factor evalu- 
ates,76 the court decided that it weighed in favor of an award of attor-
ney’s fees in this particular case.77 Specifically, the court noted that 
the plaintiff prevailed on four of his six claims and that the interest 
asserted by the plaintiff—the right to be free of discrimination—was 
an important one.78 However, the court tempered this apparent victo-
ry for the plaintiff by noting that the victory on liability was mostly 
technical—the defendant did not respond to the plaintiff’s request for 
                                                                                                                    
 66. The court did so because the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff’s request 
for admissions, and the court therefore deemed the allegations true. 625 F. Supp. 2d at 
202-03. 
 67. Id. at 204. 
 68. Id.
 69. Id. at 205. 
 70. Id.
 71. Id. at 206 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992)). 
 72. Id. at 206-07. 
 73. Id. at 207. 
 74. Id. The plaintiff tried to analogize his case to Buss v. Quigg, No. 01-CV-3908, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19324, at *2, 5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2002), aff’d, 91 F. App’x 759 (3d Cir. 
2004) (awarding attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who requested $150,000 but won only nomin-
al damages). Id. at 207 n.8. The court, however, rejected that argument. Id.
 75. Id. at 207-08. As noted previously, there is a split of authority regarding how the 
courts evaluate this factor. Some courts evaluate the number of claims on which the plain-
tiff was successful, while other courts evaluate the importance of the legal issue on which 
the plaintiff was successful. See supra note 57. 
 76. Id. at 207-08. 
 77. Id. at 208. 
 78. Id. By looking at both of these issues, the court was evaluating the second 
O’Connor factor with respect to both the number of claims on which the plaintiff was suc-
cessful and the importance of the plaintiff’s claims. 
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admissions in a timely manner.79 As a result, although the court con-
cluded that the second O’Connor factor weighed in favor of an award 
of fees, the court did not believe that the factor carried much 
weight.80
 Finally, the court considered the public purpose of the litigation.81
After noting that litigation serves “a public purpose when it vindi-
cates the rights of others, creates new precedent, deters future depri-
vations, and/or provokes a change in the defendant’s behavior,”82 the 
court then concluded that the plaintiff’s case did not “result in 
ground-breaking conclusions of law,”83 nor would it have “a profound 
influence on the development of the law and on society.”84 As a result 
of these two determinations and the fact that the plaintiff sought 
compensation for only his own injuries and not for those of his co-
workers, the court determined that this factor weighed against an 
award of fees.85 Therefore, after weighing the three O’Connor factors, 
the court determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a fee 
award, even though he was the prevailing party.86
 Similar to the court in Petrunich, the court in Zeuner v. Rare Hos-
pitality International, Inc., also utilized the three O’Connor factors 
from Farrar and concluded that a victorious plaintiff was not entitled 
to recover attorney’s fees.87 In Zeuner, the plaintiff brought suit 
against her former employer, alleging sexual harassment and wrong-
ful termination based on pregnancy.88 The jury found in favor of the 
plaintiff on her harassment claim but found in favor of the defendant 
on the wrongful discharge claim.89 Despite prevailing on the Title VII 
sexual harassment claim, the court awarded only nominal damages 
in the amount of one dollar.90 Because the jury found in favor of the 
plaintiff on one count, and because the court awarded nominal dam-
ages, the plaintiff sought an award of attorney’s fees.91
                                                                                                                    
 79. Id.
 80. Id.
 81. Id. at 208-09. 
 82. Id. at 209.  
 83. Id. (quoting Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 84. Id. (quoting Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
 85. Id. The court did, however, observe that the complaint did implicate an “impor-
tant interest—the right to a discrimination-free workplace . . . .” Id. 
 86. Id. See also McBurrows v. Mich. Dep’t of Transp., 159 F. App’x 638, 641 (6th Cir. 
2005). In McBurrows, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision that no fees were appro-
priate when a plaintiff won nominal damages of one dollar after seeking over $500,000 in 
damages in a retaliation case. Id.
 87. 386 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638-39 (M.D.N.C. 2005). 
 88. Id. at 637. 
 89. Id.
 90. Id.
 91. Id.
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 The court first had to determine whether the plaintiff was a pre-
vailing party. Based upon the Farrar opinion, the court concluded 
that she was the prevailing party because she was awarded an enfor-
ceable judgment against the defendant.92 After making this determi-
nation, the court addressed whether an attorney’s fee award was 
warranted in this case or whether this was the typical nominal-
damage case where an award of attorney’s fees was inappropriate.93
It reiterated several of the statements from Farrar, the most impor-
tant of which was the Court’s statement that “[w]hen the recovery of 
nominal damages is caused by the plaintiff’s ‘failure to prove an es-
sential element of [her] claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable 
fee is usually no fee at all.’ ”94
 The court then discussed Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion 
and analyzed the three O’Connor factors.95 In addressing the first is-
sue—the amount requested by the plaintiff compared to the amount 
ultimately awarded to her—the court noted that the plaintiff sought 
close to $2 million, plus other damages, yet she received only one dol-
lar from the defendant.96 The court also noted that the plaintiff fo-
cused solely on monetary relief and did not seek any injunctive relief 
during the proceedings.97 In comparing the two figures (the almost $2 
million requested and the one dollar awarded), the court found that 
the plaintiff’s award was “quite limited,” and the first O’Connor fac-
tor therefore weighed in favor of denying fees.98
 The court then briefly addressed the second and third O’Connor 
factors and concluded that this case was the “usual nominal-damages 
case” in which an award of fees was not appropriate.99 Specifically, 
the court first stated that “[t]he case was not legally significant” and 
that it was “a typical civil rights action in which [the] [p]laintiff was 
seeking to vindicate her personal rights.”100 The court then noted that 
the plaintiff’s failure to recover any compensatory damages was based, 
in part, on her decision not to seek such damages.101 Finally, the court 
ended its brief discussion of the second and third O’Connor factors by 
concluding that the only reasonable fee was “no fee at all.”102
 Another case in which a victorious civil rights plaintiff was 
awarded only nominal damages and denied attorney’s fees was Pouil-
                                                                                                                    
 92. Id. at 638-39. 
 93. Id.
 94. Id. at 638 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992)). 
 95. Id. at 638-39. 
 96. Id. at 639. 
 97. Id.
 98. Id.
 99. Id.
 100. Id.
 101. Id.
 102. Id.
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lon v. Little, a case involving an anti-abortion activist who was even-
tually awarded two dollars in nominal damages for his claims under 
the First and Fourth Amendments.103 This case involved two trials 
and two visits to the Sixth Circuit. One of the issues presented in the 
case was whether the nominal-damage award justified an award of 
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.104 The district court deter-
mined that a fee award of just over $35,000 was appropriate, and the 
defendants appealed.105
 Not surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit first looked at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
and Farrar and concluded that, even though the statute does allow 
for a reasonable attorney’s fee for victorious civil rights plaintiffs, 
plaintiffs who win only nominal damages are usually not entitled to 
attorney’s fees.106 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiff 
was a prevailing party under Farrar, but it also found that a reason-
able fee in cases where only nominal damages are awarded is usually 
“no fee at all.”107 The court found that the plaintiff’s request for both 
compensatory and punitive damages and his decision to turn down 
the defendant’s settlement offers demonstrated that the plaintiff was 
seeking money rather than vindication of his rights; as a result, this 
factor weighed against an award of attorney’s fees.108 Although the 
district court indicated that it believed the plaintiff most likely felt 
vindicated (and it therefore awarded fees), the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that this fact was insufficient to grant the plaintiff’s attorney’s 
fee request.109 Because the degree of success is the most critical factor 
under the Farrar analysis, and because the plaintiff received only 
nominal damages, the Sixth Circuit rejected the lower court’s analy-
sis.110 Noting also that “technical vindication of one’s constitutional 
rights alone is not enough to justify an award of attorney’s fees pur-
suant to § 1988,” the court concluded that, even though the plaintiff 
demonstrated a violation of his rights, he was not entitled to recover 
his attorney’s fees for doing so.111 And, similar to the court in Johnson 
v. City of Aiken,112 the court did not address the other two O’Connor 
factors from Farrar.
                                                                                                                    
 103. 326 F.3d 713, 715-16 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 104. Id. at 716. The Sixth Circuit’s earlier opinion can be found at Pouillon v. City of 
Owosso, 206 F.3d 711 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 105. Pouillon, 326 F.3d at 716. 
 106. Id.
 107. Id. at 716-17. 
 108. See id. at 718. 
 109. Id. at 716-17. 
 110. Id.
 111. Id.
 112. 278 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2002). This case will be discussed in detail infra notes 133-
145 and accompanying text. 
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 Another case in which the court denied attorney’s fees to plaintiffs 
who were able to demonstrate a violation of their rights was Briggs v. 
Marshall.113 In Briggs, the plaintiffs filed suit against various defen-
dants under various theories of liability based upon allegations of 
wrongful arrest and detention, excessive force, and state tort law.114
When the case went to the jury, not all claims remained, and the jury 
returned a mixed verdict.115 For purposes of this Article, the jury’s 
key determination was not that one of the defendants had used ex-
cessive force, but that the appropriate amount of damages was one 
dollar.116 After addressing issues regarding jury instructions and no-
minal damages, issues on which the court of appeals agreed with the 
district court,117 the court of appeals addressed whether attorney’s 
fees were appropriate in this case.118 The district court had previously 
determined that attorney’s fees were not appropriate.119
 The Seventh Circuit started its attorney’s fees discussion with its 
announcement that it would use the test articulated by Justice 
O’Connor in Farrar.120 Like most courts that have addressed this is-
sue, the Briggs court found that the most important factor under Jus-
tice O’Connor’s test was the difference between the amount sought 
and the amount recovered.121 Noting that the plaintiffs requested 
$75,000 in compensatory damages, plus punitive damages, and that 
the jury awarded only nominal damages, the court concluded that 
this factor weighed against awarding fees.122
 The court then considered the significance of the legal issue on 
which the plaintiffs prevailed.123 The court found this factor the least 
significant of the three and interpreted it to evaluate “the extent to 
which the plaintiffs succeeded on their claims.”124 Although the plain-
tiffs prevailed on only one of many claims, the Seventh Circuit de-
termined that the lower court acted within its discretion when it de-
cided that this factor weighed slightly in favor of awarding fees.125
 Finally, the court looked at whether the litigation served any pub-
lic purpose.126 The court noted the most relevant point when analyz-
ing this factor is “whether the plaintiffs established anything more 
                                                                                                                    
 113. 93 F.3d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 114. Id. at 358. 
 115. Id.
 116. Id.
  117. Id. at 359-60. 
 118. Id. at 361. 
 119. Id. at 358. 
 120. Id. at 361. 
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than that their constitutional rights were violated.”127 Comparing this 
case to prior Seventh Circuit precedent on the issue,128 the court 
noted that the plaintiffs “did not obtain an injunction prohibiting fu-
ture violations, and they ‘did not establish that the defendants’ con-
duct was sufficiently reprehensible to warrant punitive damages.’ ”129
As a result, and even after acknowledging that a violation of an indi-
vidual’s rights is important, the court relied on Farrar for the propo-
sition that, even when such a violation is demonstrated, attorney’s 
fees in nominal-damage cases are typically not warranted.130 The Se-
venth Circuit then concluded that the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying fees.131
 In some of these nominal-damage cases, courts considered only the 
first O’Connor factor from Farrar and concluded that an attorney’s 
fee award was inappropriate.132 For example, in Johnson v. City of 
Aiken, several plaintiffs sued several defendants alleging various civ-
il rights violations as well as a state law claim for assault.133 After a 
jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on several counts, the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed, leaving only two awards intact.134 The Fourth Circuit 
allowed a $50,000 award (based on the state law assault claims) to 
stand on appeal, and it also allowed a $0.35 award (based on the civil 
rights violation claim) to stand.135 The issue on appeal in the Fourth 
Circuit was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a fee award based 
on their successful state law claim while being awarded only nominal 
damages on the civil rights claim.136
 The lower court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
such an award, but the Fourth Circuit reversed.137 Although the de-
fendants conceded that these nominal damages entitled the plaintiffs 
to prevailing party status, they argued that the only reasonable at-
torney’s fee was no fee.138 The court agreed, determining that it was 
inappropriate for the lower court to look at the plaintiffs’ success on 
the state law claims when deciding whether an award of attorney’s 
                                                                                                                    
 127. Id.
 128. Id. Specifically, the court relied on Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 129. Id. (quoting Maul, 23 F.3d at 147). 
 130. Id.
 131. Id.
 132. In addition to Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2002), which 
will be addressed now, the court in the previously discussed case of Pouillon also analyzed 
only the first of the three factors from Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Farrar.
Pouillon v. Little, 326 F.3d 713, 716-17 (6th Cir. 2003).   
 133. 278 F.3d at 335. 
 134. Id. at 335-36. The unpublished table decision reversing part of the judgment can 
be found at Johnson v. City of Aiken, 217 F.3d 839 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 135. Johnson, 278 F.3d at 336.  
 136. Id.
 137. Id. at 336, 339. 
 138. Id. at 336. 
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fees was appropriate under the federal claims.139 The court therefore 
had to evaluate the plaintiffs’ success on the federal claims.140 Rely-
ing on Farrar, the court concluded that, because the plaintiffs won 
only nominal damages on their federal claims, a fee award under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 would be inappropriate.141 The court noted that the 
success obtained by the plaintiffs in this case was “no greater than 
that had by the plaintiff in Farrar.”142 As a result, the “success” the 
plaintiffs enjoyed in this case “did little more than provide them ‘the 
moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that 
[their] rights had been violated.’ ”143 Accordingly, despite the fact that 
the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the defendants violated their 
rights, the court determined that the lower court abused its discre-
tion in awarding attorney’s fees.144 As stated earlier, it is interesting 
that the court neither mentioned nor applied the second or third fac-
tors from the O’Connor concurrence in Farrar.145
 Even in cases in which plaintiffs are awarded more than nominal 
damages, some courts nonetheless determine that attorney’s fees are 
inappropriate. One such case was Leggett v. Gold International, Inc., 
where the plaintiff in a Title VII and state law sexual battery claim 
won a $5000 punitive-damage award but was awarded no compensato-
ry damages.146 The issue before the court was whether the punitive-
damage award was sufficient to warrant an award of attorney’s fees.147
 The court first noted that in Title VII actions, punitive damages 
are recoverable, even in the absence of a compensatory-damage 
award.148 The court then relied on Farrar for the proposition that 
such a plaintiff is a prevailing party; however, the court next focused 
on the fact that the degree of the plaintiff’s success is the key factor 
when determining the reasonableness of any award of attorney’s 
fees.149 Rather than go through an extensive analysis of Justice 
O’Connor’s three-factor Farrar test, the court simply observed the fol-
lowing: “[The plaintiff] received a small sum in punitive damages, in-
stead of the $3.5 million she sought in her complaint. [Her] prosecution 
of this action accomplished little except providing her with the moral 
satisfaction of having her rights vindicated in a federal court, ‘in some 
                                                                                                                    
 139. Id. at 337. 
 140. Id. at 338. 
 141. Id.
 142. Id.
 143. Id. (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992)). 
 144. Id. Although this was no comfort to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Fourth Circuit 
did note that its decision “in no way” reflected on the excellent work the attorneys per-
formed on behalf of their clients. Id. at 338 n.10. 
 145. See id. at 338-39. 
 146. No. CV205-137, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9081, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2007). 
 147. Id. at *2. 
 148. Id. at *3. 
 149. Id. (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109-14 (1992)). 
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unspecified way.’ ”150 The court then concluded that the plaintiff’s 
“modest success” did not warrant an award of attorney’s fees.151
 A case in which a Title VII plaintiff prevailed on the issue of liabil-
ity but was awarded almost nothing in attorney’s fees was Schlant v. 
Victor Belata Belting Co.152 In Schlant, the plaintiff alleged violations 
of Title VII, the parallel state civil rights statute, and tort claims.153
The jury determined that the employer had, in fact, discriminated 
against the plaintiff on the basis of gender, but that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to damages other than back pay or front pay.154 The 
amount of these damages was just over $800, plus pre-judgment in-
terest.155 The plaintiff sought an award of attorney’s fees and costs. 
The defendant, while conceding that the plaintiff was the prevailing 
party, argued that she was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees 
because her success was de minimis.156
 After agreeing that the plaintiff was the prevailing party, the 
court engaged in an analysis of whether she should be entitled to an 
award of attorney’s fees.157 The court first relied on a pre-Farrar case 
from the United States Supreme Court, Hensley v. Eckerhart, for the 
proposition that where a plaintiff 
has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours 
reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasona-
ble hourly rate may be an excessive amount. This will be true even 
where the plaintiff’s claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and 
raised in good faith. Congress has not authorized an award of fees 
whenever it was reasonable for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or 
whenever conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and 
skill. The most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.158
 The court then noted that the “fees requested . . . must be reason-
able in relation to the degree of success obtained.”159 After briefly re-
ferring to Justice Thomas’s opinion in Farrar, the court focused its 
attention on Justice O’Connor’s three-factor test.160 The court then 
compared the amount the plaintiff sought in her lawsuit to the 
amount she was awarded.161 She requested over $2.7 million, yet she 
                                                                                                                    
 150. Id. at *3-4 (citation omitted) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114). 
 151. Id. at *4. 
 152. No. 94-CV-0915E(Sc), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16539 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001). 
 153. Id.
 154. Id. at *2-3. 
 155. Id. at *3. 
 156. Id. at *3-4. 
 157. Id. at *5, 6-17. 
 158. Id. at *7 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)). 
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 160. Id. at *8-9. 
 161. Id. at *9-11. 
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obtained a judgment of just over $800.162 As a result of this disparity, 
the court concluded, “the first of Justice O’Connor’s factors suggests 
that plaintiff’s recovery is de minimis due to the substantial difference 
between the judgment she sought and that which she recovered.”163
 The court then addressed the second of Justice O’Connor’s fac-
tors—the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff pre-
vailed.164 While the plaintiff argued that she was entitled to a full at-
torney’s fee award because the jury concluded that the defendant in-
tentionally discriminated against her,165 the defendant argued that 
this was not sufficient to justify an award of attorney’s fees.166 Agree-
ing with the defendant, the court noted that “[t]he moral satisfaction 
of knowing that a jury concluded that defendant had discriminated 
against her does not entitle plaintiff to attorney’s fees.”167 The court 
found that what is most important in evaluating Justice O’Connor’s 
second factor “is not the significance of the legal issue to [the] plain-
tiff personally,” but rather the “significance [of the issue] to the legal 
community as a whole . . . .”168 Relying on Second Circuit precedent, 
the court noted that “the ‘vast majority of civil rights litigation does 
not result in ground-breaking conclusions of law, and therefore, will 
only be appropriate candidates for fee awards if a plaintiff recovers 
some significant measure of damages or other meaningful relief.’ ”169
Because there were no such novel legal issues involved in this  
case, the court concluded that this factor also weighed against a  
fee award.170
 Finally, the court examined the third O’Connor factor—“whether 
the victory ‘accomplished some public goal other than occupying the 
time and energy of counsel, court, and client.’ ”171 The plaintiff argued 
that the lawsuit did achieve some public good—as a result of this 
lawsuit, several of the defendant’s other employees discussed the 
case and contacted the plaintiff’s attorney, advising him that they 
had also been victims of discrimination.172 Because none of these oth-
er claims was ever filed, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that the case served anyone other than the plaintiff.173 The court 
                                                                                                                    
 162. Id. at *10. 
 163. Id. at *11. 
 164. Id. at *11-13. 
 165. Id. at *11. 
 166. Id. at *4. 
 167. Id. at *12. 
 168. Id. at *12-13. This analysis seems to combine Justice O’Connor’s second and  
third factors. 
 169. Id. at *13 (quoting Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
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 171. Id. (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 121-22 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 172. Id. at *13-14. 
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therefore concluded that the plaintiff’s recovery was de minimis  
and she was entitled to little or no fees.174 The court settled on a  
figure that represented one-third of the plaintiff’s award—just  
under $300.175
 As this Part of the Article demonstrates, several courts are using 
Justice O’Connor’s three-factor test from Farrar to conclude that 
plaintiffs who recover only nominal damages are entitled to either no 
attorney’s fees or very limited attorney’s fees.176 In all of these cases, 
even though plaintiffs proved that their employer or a government 
official violated their rights, the courts still found that attorney’s fees 
are rarely appropriate unless the plaintiff obtains more than a de 
minimis victory. Although most courts have reached this conclusion, 
there are a few rare cases in which courts have awarded fees even 
though the plaintiffs won only nominal damages. The next Part of 
this Article addresses some of those decisions. 
IV.   CASES WHERE THE FEE AWARDED WAS CLOSE TO THE AWARD 
REQUESTED
 Although the previous Part of this Article illustrated that most 
courts are denying attorney’s fees in cases where plaintiffs recover 
only nominal damages, some courts are using the three O’Connor fac-
tors from Farrar to reach the opposite conclusion—plaintiffs who 
demonstrate civil rights violations are entitled to an award of attor-
ney’s fees despite the fact that they recovered only nominal damages.   
 For instance, in Brandau v. Kansas, the Tenth Circuit awarded 
attorney’s fees to a plaintiff although she won only nominal dam-
ages.177 In Brandau, the plaintiff sued under Title VII on the theories 
of hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive dis-
charge.178 The plaintiff prevailed on her hostile environment claim, 
but the jury awarded her only one dollar in nominal damages.179 The 
                                                                                                                    
 174. Id. at *16. 
 175. Id. at *17. The plaintiff sought an award of over $46,000.  Id. 
 176. See Benton v. Or. Student Assistance Comm’n, 421 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2005) (re-
versing fee award of over $370,000 in nominal-damage case after analyzing Farrar fac-
tors); Boston’s Children First v. City of Boston, 395 F.3d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 2005) (denying at-
torney’s fees to victorious nominal-damage plaintiff); Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 237, 
239 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing an attorney’s fee award of over $50,000 after the plaintiff was 
awarded only nominal damages); Williams v. Town of Randolph, 574 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252, 
254 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees after plaintiff lost most 
of his claims and was awarded only nominal damages for his successful claim); Guy v. City 
of San Diego, No. 06cv0766 JM(LSP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38360, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 
2008) (denying fees to nominal-damage plaintiff who sought over $219,700 in damages).  
 177. 168 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 178. Id. at 1180. 
 179. Id. at 1181. 
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trial court awarded the plaintiff her attorney’s fees as the prevailing 
party, and the defendant appealed to the Tenth Circuit.180
 Naturally, the Tenth Circuit started its analysis with a discussion 
of the Farrar opinion, with particular emphasis on Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence and Justice White’s opinion in which he noted that at-
torney’s fees can be appropriate in some cases where only nominal 
damages are awarded.181 The Tenth Circuit then analyzed whether 
the district court abused its discretion in applying Justice O’Connor’s 
test.182 Beginning with the first factor, the district court noted that 
the plaintiff sought back pay and only $50,000 in non-economic dam-
ages, unlike the plaintiffs in Farrar, who sought $17 million in dam-
ages.183 Also, although the jury’s monetary award was minimal, “the 
jury’s ‘verdict vindicated the violation of [the plaintiff’s] civil 
rights.’ ”184 Finally, before addressing the second O’Connor factor, the 
district court distinguished the case from Farrar by noting that this 
case was not protracted, did not require multiple trips to the court of 
appeals, and did not carry on for close to a decade.185
 The district court then discussed the second O’Connor factor—the 
significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.186
Agreeing with the district court’s finding that the plaintiff’s victory 
on her sexual harassment claim was significant, the Tenth Circuit 
determined that the second O’Connor factor also weighed in favor of 
a fee award, despite the fact that the plaintiff had not prevailed on 
her other claims.187 Specifically, the district court found that the 
plaintiff’s success was significant because it achieved at least some of 
her desired benefit in bringing the suit.188
 Finally, although the plaintiff brought suit only on her own behalf, 
the court agreed that the lawsuit served a public purpose.189 The dis-
trict court concluded that the litigation put the defendant on notice of 
the need to educate its employees about sexual harassment and the 
need to investigate those claims, and that current and future em-
ployees would benefit as a result of the plaintiff’s victory.190 Because 
the Tenth Circuit was not convinced that the lower court’s analysis 
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was flawed, it concluded that it was in no position to reverse the fee 
award.191 Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court 
and concluded that there were “no special circumstances that would 
render [the] award unjust” and affirmed the district court’s decision 
to award fees.192
 Another case in which plaintiffs recovered almost all of the fees 
requested was Buss v. Quigg, which involved plaintiffs who were 
eventually awarded nominal damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in-
volving violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.193 At 
trial, the jury found that the defendant did violate the plaintiffs’ 
rights, but it failed to award even nominal damages because of an er-
ror in the jury instructions.194 The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first concluded that there was 
an error with the jury instructions and that the plaintiffs should 
have been awarded nominal damages pursuant to Supreme Court 
precedent.195 The court then addressed the issue of what attorney’s 
fee, if any, was appropriate.196 The defendant first argued, in direct 
conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding in Farrar, that the plain-
tiffs were not prevailing parties.197 Citing Farrar, the court quickly 
rejected this argument.198 The court then addressed whether the 
plaintiffs’ status as prevailing parties warranted a fee award.199
 Relying on the legislative history behind 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Su-
preme Court precedent, the district court reiterated the importance 
of civil rights lawsuits and the need for attorneys to represent indi-
viduals whose rights have been violated.200 The court then addressed 
the Farrar conclusion that an award of attorney’s fees is inappro-
priate in most nominal-damage cases.201 The court also noted that the 
majority opinion in Farrar gave “imperfect guidance” to lower courts 
and, as a result, courts have retained their discretion to award attor-
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ney’s fees to plaintiffs even when those plaintiffs win only nominal 
damages.202 Next, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
Farrar established a per se rule against awarding fees in nominal-
damage cases.203
 Similar to most courts faced with fee requests from nominal-
damage plaintiffs, the district court in Buss then analyzed the three-
factor test Justice O’Connor articulated in Farrar.204 The court first 
addressed the extent of the relief obtained.205 Although the defendant 
pointed to several cases in which plaintiffs sought high damage 
awards but received either nominal damages or a sum significantly 
less than that which was requested, the court distinguished those 
cases by noting that the plaintiffs in Buss sought only $150,000 in 
damages.206 The court also noted that “it [was] plainly evident that 
[the] [p]laintiffs here sought vindication of their constitutional 
rights,”207 and because the jury determined that the defendant did, in 
fact, violate those rights, the plaintiffs “gained an authoritative de-
termination that they rightly acted to enforce their constitutional 
right against unreasonable search and seizure in their home.”208 The 
court therefore determined that the discrepancy in the amount 
awarded and the amount sought weighed in favor of a fee award.209
 The next factor the court considered was the significance of the le-
gal issue on which the plaintiffs prevailed.210 The court emphasized 
the importance of the violation of the plaintiffs’ rights in this case 
(unlawfully entering a home) as opposed to the importance of the vi-
olation at issue in Farrar (injury to a business interest), finding that 
the defendant’s unlawful entry into the plaintiffs’ home was signifi-
cant.211 The court then observed that some courts interpret the 
second O’Connor factor to require an analysis of the theory of liability 
upon which a plaintiff prevailed.212 After noting that the plaintiffs 
prevailed on only one theory, the court determined that this one vic-
tory was enough for the second O’Connor factor to weigh in favor of a 
fee award.213
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 Finally, the court evaluated whether the plaintiffs’ victory served 
a public purpose.214 The court found that the victory would “not likely 
cause a change in police policy or training, nor will it have potential 
collateral estoppel effects.”215 However, the court did note the impor-
tance of civil rights suits and the role of citizens to act as private at-
torneys general when their rights have been violated.216 Concluding 
that the plaintiffs’ victory could not be “cast in monetary terms,” the 
court in Buss determined that the third O’Connor factor also weighed 
in favor of awarding attorney’s fees.217 The court relied on the Se-
venth Circuit’s opinion in Hyde v. Small for the conclusion that a 
small award in a civil rights case does not, and should not, preclude 
an award of attorney’s fees.218 After this analysis, the court awarded 
the plaintiffs approximately $35,000 in attorney’s fees.219
 Another case in which a court used the O’Connor factors from 
Farrar to conclude that a plaintiff was entitled to an award of attor-
ney’s fees was Hare v. Potter.220 In Hare, the plaintiff brought a reta-
liatory hostile work environment claim under Title VII. Although the 
jury concluded that there was, in fact, a Title VII violation, it 
awarded the plaintiff no damages.221 The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted equitable re-
lief and ultimately concluded that, as the prevailing party, the plain-
tiff was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.222 The court first ob-
served that parties traditionally bear their own costs in litigation; 
however, it then noted that some statutory schemes, such as the one 
established under Title VII, allowed a prevailing party to recover fees 
from the opposing party.223 The court stated that the purpose behind 
such fee-shifting provisions is to encourage victims of discrimination 
“to seek judicial relief,” and that “[i]f successful plaintiffs were rou-
tinely forced to bear their own attorney[’s] fees, few aggrieved parties 
would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the 
injunctive powers of the federal courts.”224 However, relying on Far-
rar, the court found that a plaintiff is not entitled to prevailing party 
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72 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:49 
status absent an enforceable judgment.225 The court then wrestled with 
the issue of whether the plaintiff was, in fact, the prevailing party.226
 The court acknowledged that this was a “close question,” but it ul-
timately decided that the plaintiff was a prevailing party.227 Relying 
on Third Circuit precedent, the court concluded that being forced to 
perform supplemental training and to post notices of the verdict al-
tered the relationship between the parties, and that the plaintiff be-
nefitted from this change.228 Additionally, the defendant was required 
to consult with the plaintiff, who no longer worked for the defendant, 
about various aspects of the judgment. This provided further evi-
dence that the plaintiff was the prevailing party and thus eligible for 
an award of fees.229 Believing that this type of relief “altered the legal 
relationship between the parties and achieved some benefit sought in 
bringing the suit,”230 the court decided that this was “more than . . . 
mere ‘moral satisfaction’ from ‘a favorable statement of law.’ ”231
 The court then addressed the three-factor O’Connor test from Far-
rar.232 Although the Third Circuit had not yet affirmatively decided 
that it would apply Justice O’Connor’s test, the court concluded that 
the Third Circuit had suggested it would follow that test if presented 
with the issue.233 In applying the first factor—the difference between 
the relief sought and the relief awarded—the court decided that the 
factor weighed in favor of the plaintiff.234 Specifically, although the 
plaintiff initially alleged nine claims and the jury found in favor of 
the plaintiff on only one, the court concluded that the plaintiff  
received some “tangible equitable relief.”235 The court found this  
sufficient to tip the scales in favor of the plaintiff on the first 
O’Connor factor.236
 The court next addressed the second factor—the significance of 
the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.237 Noting that differ-
ent courts evaluate this factor differently, the court concluded that, 
under either analysis (the importance of the legal issue or the extent 
of the plaintiff’s success on the theories of liability), the factor 
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weighed in favor of awarding fees.238 First, the court determined that 
the plaintiff’s victory on her retaliatory hostile work environment 
claim was “an important legal issue.”239 Second, the court concluded 
that her victory was a “ ‘significant issue in litigation’ achieving 
‘some of the benefit she sought in bringing suit.’ ”240 As a result of 
these two determinations, the court concluded that the second 
O’Connor factor, regardless of how the court evaluated it, weighed in 
favor of awarding fees.241
 Finally, the court evaluated whether the litigation served an im-
portant public purpose and concluded that it did.242 Specifically, the 
court noted that “successful Title VII cases achieve an important 
public purpose.”243 Noting that the Supreme Court had previously 
announced that “Congress intended a Title VII plaintiff to be the 
‘chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate a policy that Congress 
considered the highest priority,’ ’’244 the court then noted that in this 
particular case, the verdict provided a benefit to the defendant’s 
present and future employees, and that it was in the public’s inter-
est.245 The court also observed that this outcome could deter future 
retaliatory conduct.246 Finally, the court found that the plaintiff “pre-
vailed on a significant issue in the case, and the litigation served an 
important public interest by exposing conduct in violation of Title 
VII.”247 As a result, the plaintiff was entitled to a fee award.248
 As this Part of the Article demonstrates, not all courts follow the 
majority view and instead award attorney’s fees in cases where plain-
tiffs recover only nominal damages.249 Although some of the cases de-
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scribed in the previous Parts of this Article did not take an all-or-
nothing approach, in most of those cases, the awards were either so 
insignificant so as to be almost meaningless or extremely close to 
what the plaintiff requested. The next Part of the Article will de-
scribe cases where the court granted attorney’s fee awards that were 
at least significant enough to be meaningful to the attorneys who 
helped their clients obtain prevailing party status but were also not 
particularly close to what the plaintiffs requested.   
V.   CASES WHERE THE COURTS HAVE AWARDED LIMITED FEES
 Instead of taking an all-or-nothing approach, some courts have de-
termined that plaintiffs who are awarded only nominal damages are 
entitled to a percentage of the fees requested; however, in many of 
these cases, this figure is small and does not adequately compensate 
the plaintiff’s attorney.250 However, the awards described in the cases 
discussed in this Part of the Article were at least not meaningless to 
the attorney and his client.  
 One case in which a plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees was re-
duced because of her limited success was Picou v. City of Jackson,
where the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in reducing the award of attorney’s fees by 
75%.251 In Picou, the plaintiff prevailed in a lawsuit involving sex dis-
crimination and retaliation, and the jury awarded her $400,000 in 
emotional distress damages.252 The district court reduced this award 
to $50,000 but also allowed for an attorney’s fee award of $40,000; 
however, the Fifth Circuit ultimately reversed the award of emotion-
al distress damages.253 On remand, the district court awarded nomin-
al damages and reduced the attorney’s fee award to $10,000.254 The 
district court determined that the plaintiff did, however, establish 
sex discrimination, “which would deter future discrimination.”255
 Relying on Farrar, the Fifth Circuit first noted that the appropri-
ate fee award is usually no fee when a plaintiff recovers only nominal 
damages.256 The court then cited Fifth Circuit precedent for the prop-
osition that, even in the absence of monetary relief, attorney’s fees 
may be appropriate when the plaintiff achieves a goal such as deter-
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ring unlawful behavior.257 The court stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “is a 
tool that ensures the vindication of important rights, even when large 
sums of money are not at stake, by making attorney’s fees available 
under a private attorney general theory.”258 The court cited the dis-
trict court’s conclusion that the plaintiff had “achieved a compensable 
goal” of establishing sex discrimination that should serve as a deter-
rent to her employer.259 The court also observed that “[t]he district 
court weighed [the plaintiff’s] overall degree of success, considered 
her lack of compensatory damages, but still found she succeeded in 
deterring future discrimination.”260 The court then concluded that a 
75% reduction in the award was not an abuse of discretion.261
 Another case where a plaintiff achieved only limited success and 
had her attorney’s fee request reduced was Black v. M.G.A., Inc.262 In 
Black, the plaintiff alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title 
VII (discrimination and retaliation), and she eventually accepted an 
offer of judgment for $5000.263 After accepting the offer, the plaintiff 
sought attorney’s fees of over $50,000.264 Because the settlement 
amount was small, the defendant argued that the plaintiff was en-
titled to either a small fee award or no fee award.265
 The court first evaluated the number of hours expended on the 
case, the reasonableness of the hourly rate for the attorneys who 
worked on the case, and the twelve factors outlined in Johnson.266 Af-
ter addressing all of the relevant factors, the court then considered 
whether the plaintiff’s fee request was reasonable based on Farrar.267
The court dismissed the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s 
willingness to accept the defendant’s offer of judgment was merely a 
“technical victory,” noting that the $5000 judgment was more than 
the amount of back pay the plaintiff sought and that the amount was 
much greater than the amount recovered in Farrar.268 The court 
therefore concluded that the rule from Farrar—that either no fee or 
an extremely low fee was warranted—was inapplicable.269
 Predictably, the court next addressed the most relevant O’Connor 
factor—the difference between the amount requested and the amount 
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obtained.270 This case was somewhat peculiar because the plaintiff’s 
complaint did not include a specific monetary demand.271 As a result, 
the court looked at the amounts the plaintiff sought during settle-
ment discussions.272 Although acknowledging that the numbers 
“floated” during settlement negotiations are not always accurate in-
dicators of the value of a claim, the court determined that, based on 
those figures, the plaintiff valued her claim between $23,000 and 
$60,000.273 After considering the plaintiff’s argument that a $5000 
settlement was significant, and after evaluating the defendant’s fi-
nancial resources, the court concluded that the offer the plaintiff ul-
timately accepted would most likely be viewed as a nuisance settle-
ment.274 As a result, the court determined that the plaintiff’s success 
was “partial at best.”275
 The court then analyzed the next two O’Connor factors—the signi-
ficance of the legal issue(s) upon which the plaintiff prevailed and 
whether the litigation advanced a public goal or served a public pur-
pose.276 In evaluating the second factor, the court essentially con-
cluded that, because the parties settled, the plaintiff prevailed on all 
of her claims.277 Finally, the court considered the third O’Connor fac-
tor—whether the litigation advanced some type of public goal.278
While the plaintiff argued that the litigation did force the employer 
to admit that it had not hired any African-American employees in 
upper management positions, the court noted that the plaintiff pro-
duced no evidence that the defendant had made any changes to its 
policy.279 As a result, the court concluded that there was no specific 
public gain from the plaintiff’s lawsuit.280 Ultimately, after weighing 
these factors, the court deemed a fee reduction of 55% appropriate.281
As a result, the plaintiff’s request for over $53,000 in fees was re-
duced to an award of just over $13,000.282
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 Another case in which a court awarded a reduced attorney’s fee 
was Ollis v. Hearthstone Homes, Inc.283 In that case, the court deter-
mined that a 25% reduction was appropriate after the plaintiff, who 
had prevailed on his Title VII claims of religion-based discrimination 
and retaliation, was awarded only one dollar in nominal damages.284
After denying the defendant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and judgment as a matter of law, the court addressed the 
plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees.285 The court noted that, accord-
ing to Title VII’s fee-shifting provision, a prevailing party is entitled 
to an award of attorney’s fees.286 The court then relied on Farrar for 
the proposition that a plaintiff who receives only nominal damages is 
still a prevailing party, but the limited degree of the plaintiff’s suc-
cess often results in an award of no fees.287
 Following Eighth Circuit precedent, the court concluded that an 
evaluation of Justice O’Connor’s three-factor test from Farrar was 
appropriate.288 The court first noted that the plaintiff had requested 
approximately $59,000, which was much less than the $17 million 
involved in Farrar.289 Although conceding there was a large difference 
between the amount sought and the amount recovered, the court im-
plied that, because that difference was not nearly as large as it was 
in Farrar and in another Eighth Circuit case, the first factor did not 
necessarily weigh against a fee award.290
 After addressing the first O’Connor factor, the court addressed the 
next two factors.291 Specifically, the court found that the issues in-
volved in the case—religious discrimination and retaliation—were 
significant legal issues, and that the plaintiff and other employees 
should be free from this type of behavior in the workplace.292 Finally, 
the court looked at whether the litigation served a public purpose.293
Relying on Eighth Circuit precedent, the court noted, “civil rights lit-
igation serves an important public purpose; ‘[a] plaintiff bringing a 
civil rights action does so not for himself alone but also as a private 
attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the 
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highest priority.’ ”294 After concluding that as a result of the litigation 
the defendant and other employers “may well review and modify 
their policies concerning religious discrimination,”295 the court deter-
mined that “an important public goal ha[d] been served.”296 Therefore, 
after evaluating the three O’Connor factors, the court found that an 
award of attorney’s fees was appropriate.297 After reviewing the hours 
spent, the attorneys’ hourly rates, and other factors, the court deter-
mined that the amount requested was reasonable but that, because 
the plaintiff’s success was “limited,” a 25% reduction was appropri-
ate.298 As a result, the plaintiff was awarded 75% of his fee request.299
 Another case in which the court substantially reduced the amount 
of attorney’s fees requested was Bell v. Board of County Commission-
ers of Jefferson County, where the court awarded only 10% of the 
plaintiff’s requested fees.300 The plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claim after losing his employment.301 The plaintiff also alleged that 
the defendant caused harm to his name and reputation.302 The jury 
determined that the defendant did violate the plaintiff’s Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights with regard to his loss of continued 
employment but awarded the plaintiff no damages.303 On the claim 
for damage to his reputation, the jury awarded the plaintiff $90,000, 
which was erased when the trial court granted the defendant’s mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment.304 The plaintiff then sought an 
award of attorney’s fees, believing he was a prevailing party.305
 After ultimately concluding that the plaintiff was the prevailing 
party, the court addressed whether an award of attorney’s fees was 
appropriate.306 Noting that these determinations are within the trial 
court’s discretion, the court first looked at the number of hours the 
plaintiff’s attorneys spent on the case and their respective hourly 
rates.307 Although the court found that the number of hours spent 
was reasonable, the court made slight downward adjustments to the 
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2004). In Certain, the court reduced the plaintiff’s fee request by 20% based on the limited 
success the plaintiff experienced on her hostile environment claim.  Id.
 300. No. 03-2148-KHV, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2187, at *14 (D. Kan. Feb.15, 2005), 
aff’d, 451 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 301. Id. at *1-2. 
 302. Id. at *2. 
 303. Id.
 304. Id. at *2-3. 
 305. Id. at *3. 
 306. Id. at *3-8. 
 307. Id. at *8-11. 
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attorneys’ hourly rates.308 The plaintiff conceded that such a reduc-
tion in fees based on the limited success was appropriate, but he ar-
gued that only a 30% reduction was appropriate.309 The defendant, on 
the other hand, argued that the fees should be “drastically” re-
duced.310 The court referenced the Farrar opinion and noted that “the 
most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award 
is the degree of success obtained.”311 Although the court did not go 
through a detailed analysis of the O’Connor factors, the court did 
note the plaintiff’s limited monetary success, the length of the litiga-
tion, and the fact that the litigation did not break any new legal 
ground.312 As a result, the court determined that a 90% reduction in 
the fee award was appropriate.313
 As this Part of the Article demonstrates, not all courts deny attor-
ney’s fee requests in cases where the plaintiffs receive only nominal, 
or very limited, damages.314 Although these courts usually reduce the 
fees by a significant amount, they at least provide some compensa-
tion for the attorneys who successfully prove a violation of the plain-
tiff’s rights. While providing these attorneys with such limited recov-
ery is certainly better than denying them compensation for their 
“successful” efforts, not providing them with significant compensa-
tion for the time they spent proving these violations will have a nega-
tive effect on civil rights litigation. As the next Part of the Article will 
illustrate, courts should be more willing to grant fee requests when 
these requests are made by plaintiffs who are able to prove violations 
of their rights. 
                                                                                                                    
 308. Id.
 309. Id. at *12. 
 310. Id. at *13. 
 311. Id.
 312. Id. at *13. The plaintiff initially sought $1.4 million in damages, which the Tenth 
Circuit categorized as an “extravagant and overreaching request.” Bell v. Bd. of County 
Comm’rs, 451 F.3d 1097, 1104-05 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 313. Bell, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2187, at *14.  
 314. See also Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 765 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(awarding nominal-damage plaintiffs 50% of the amount of fees requested because victory 
was more than “merely technical,” it benefitted individuals other than the plaintiffs, and 
the right vindicated was not easily reduced to a sum of money); Spencer v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2006) (granting the plaintiff approximately 
$39,000 in fees, which represented only 25% of the fee amount she requested); Hyde v. 
Small, No. 97-3719, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2684, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 1998) (awarding 
over $11,000 in attorney’s fees, which represented approximately 35% of the amount re-
quested); Smith v. Borough of Dunmore, No. 3:05-CV-1343, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80450, 
at *36-37 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2008) (awarding nominal-damage plaintiff $20,000 in attorney’s 
fees after the plaintiff requested over $140,000); Lee v. McCue, No. 04-civ-6077 (CM), 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57867, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (awarding nominal-damage plain-
tiff $35,000 in attorney’s fees after the plaintiff requested over $97,000 in fees); Aynes v. 
Space Guard Prods., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 445, 451-52 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (reducing the fee request 
by approximately 90% even though the court determined that (1) the plaintiff’s recovery 
was not de minimis; (2) the second O’Connor factor favored the plaintiff; and (3) the third 
O’Connor factor was a “draw”). 
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VI.   WHY NOMINAL-DAMAGE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD RECOVER THEIR
ATTORNEY’S FEES
 In Farrar, the Supreme Court made clear that plaintiffs who re-
cover only nominal damages in civil rights lawsuits should not typi-
cally recover their attorney’s fees.315 Although most cases in which 
only nominal damages are recovered have reached this result, some 
courts have awarded attorney’s fees, albeit sometimes only limited 
fees.316 However, as the next Sections of this Article will address, the 
Court should revisit Farrar and encourage trial courts to be more lib-
eral when deciding whether to award attorney’s fees to these prevail-
ing parties. Courts should do so because application of the three 
O’Connor factors essentially guarantees that prevailing plaintiffs will 
rarely recover the attorney’s fees required to prove a civil rights vi-
olation. Additionally, courts should become more liberal when grant-
ing attorney’s fee awards in nominal-damage cases because doing so 
would encourage plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring these claims, 
even if the amount of damages is minimal; granting fees in these cas-
es would not provide a windfall for plaintiffs’ attorneys; and doing so 
would also further congressional intent.  
 The first O’Connor’s factor is skewed in such a way that it will al-
most always preclude a fee award in nominal-damage cases, and it 
could cause attorneys to undervalue their clients’ claims, creating 
conflicts of interest with their clients. The second O’Connor factor, 
especially when interpreted as meaning the importance of the legal 
issue on which the plaintiff prevails as opposed to the number of 
claims on which the plaintiff prevails,317 minimizes the importance of 
civil rights lawsuits. Finally, the third O’Connor factor also minimiz-
es the importance of civil rights lawsuits and sets such a high stan-
dard for what constitutes a “public purpose” that very few lawsuits 
will satisfy this prong of Justice O’Connor’s test.   
 In addition to the faults with Justice O’Connor’s Farrar test, there 
are other reasons courts should be more willing to award attorney’s 
fees to civil rights plaintiffs who recover only nominal damages. 
First, granting fee requests in these cases will encourage more plain-
tiffs and attorneys to bring these suits, even when the damages in-
volved are not excessive. Second, allowing fees in these cases will en-
courage individuals to follow the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody that individuals should be vigilant in 
                                                                                                                    
 315. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992); see also cases cited supra in Part III. 
 316. See supra Parts IV and V. 
 317. If courts analyze the second O’Connor factor by looking at the number of claims 
brought and the number of claims on which the plaintiff succeeded (which is implied by the 
way Justice O’Connor addressed this factor), I would suggest that the attorney be compen-
sated only for the work done in furtherance of the successful claims. See Farrar, 506 U.S. 
at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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pursuing civil rights violations by acting as private attorneys gener-
al.318 Finally, and despite some admittedly sound arguments to the 
contrary, allowing fees in these cases will be consistent with the leg-
islative history behind these civil rights fee-shifting provisions.319
 Therefore, as the next Sections of the Article will demonstrate, 
prevailing plaintiffs who successfully prove that their rights have 
been violated but are awarded only nominal damages should be en-
titled to recover the attorney’s fees required to prove the defendants’ 
unlawful conduct.  
A. Problems with Justice O’Connor’s First Factor 
 Under Justice O’Connor’s three-factor test, the most important 
factor in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee award is 
the difference between the amount sought and the amount recov-
ered.320 Obviously, in cases where the court awards only nominal 
damages, that difference will be significant. While most cases will not 
reach the seventeen-million-to-one ratio at issue in Farrar,321 many 
cases will involve large discrepancies between the amount of a no-
minal-damage judgment and the amount sought in the complaint, 
which will almost always weigh against a fee award. Also, if courts 
continue to use this factor as the guiding principle in determining 
what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee, plaintiffs’ attorneys will 
stop suing for the “full value” of their claims, believing that they will 
be punished if they do not win large enough awards to justify the full 
amount of the attorney’s fee request.322 Additionally, when an attor-
ney decides how much money he should request from a jury, he might 
ask for a lesser amount than what the facts of his case might war-
rant, knowing that the lower the figure he requests, the more likely 
he is to recover his fees if his client wins only nominal damages. This, 
of course, can create a conflict of interest between the best interests 
of the client and attorney. 
                                                                                                                    
 318. 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975). 
 319. See infra Section VI.F. Additionally, although I have not devoted a Section of the 
Article to this argument, another reason for allowing fees in nominal-damage cases is that 
by taking away a civil rights plaintiff’s very powerful weapon of possibly requiring the de-
fendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, courts might encourage unlawful behavior 
and/or a defendant’s unwillingness to settle a claim. 
 320. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 120-21 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 321. Id. at 121. 
 322. I certainly acknowledge that plaintiffs’ attorneys can sometimes intentionally in-
flate the value of their clients’ claims in hopes of a better settlement or in hopes that the 
jury will award their clients less than the figure for which they ask but more than what 
the claim is actually worth. I am not arguing that plaintiffs’ attorneys should continue this 
practice, and I do acknowledge that limiting fee awards based on the first O’Connor factor 
could have a beneficial effect on settlements and on the likelihood that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
will be more reasonable when deciding what the real value of a claim should be. 
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 The obvious starting point when discussing this issue is Farrar.
There, the plaintiffs sought $17 million and received only nominal 
damages.323 Additionally, the litigation carried on for close to a dec-
ade and involved multiple trips to the court of appeals and ultimately 
the Supreme Court.324 As a result, and especially because of the se-
venteen-million-to-one ratio of damages sought compared to the no-
minal damages recovered, Justice O’Connor opined that if ever there 
was a case to deny attorney’s fees, Farrar was that case.325
 Since Farrar, several courts have engaged in this type of mathe-
matical calculation when determining a reasonable attorney’s fee; 
however, the bottom line is clear—the less money the plaintiff re-
quests, the more likely he is to recover attorney’s fees if he is 
awarded only nominal damages. For example, in the previously dis-
cussed Buss case, the court granted most of the plaintiffs’ request for 
fees, in part because the $150,000 sought was significantly less than 
the damages requested in several other cases, including Farrar.326
The court distinguished this case from Romberg v. Nichols327 and 
Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,328 where 
the plaintiffs sought $2 million and over $650,000 in damages, re-
spectively.329 Similarly, in Ollis, the court allowed an award of attor-
ney’s fees to a plaintiff who had requested damages close to $60,000 
but won only nominal damages.330 The court noted that this case 
“pale[d] in comparison” to the facts of Farrar, where, once again, the 
court noted the seventeen-million-to-one ratio.331
Brandau is another example of the court approving an attorney’s 
fee award, partly because of the limited damages the plaintiff 
sought.332 In Brandau, the plaintiff “sought only back pay for twenty-
one months and $50,000 in non-economic damages.”333 Even though 
the plaintiff won only nominal damages, the court distinguished the 
case from Farrar and concluded that the plaintiff’s request was rea-
                                                                                                                    
 323. Id. at 106-07. 
 324. See id. at 106-09. 
 325. Id. at 116. As was noted before, Farrar was the perfect pro-defendant case to use 
to decide this issue. The plaintiffs in Farrar sued for an excessive amount, the litigation 
carried on for close to a decade, and the interest at stake was a financial one, not a person-
al one. See id. at 106-09. 
 326. Buss v. Quigg, No. 01-CV-3098, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19324, at *19 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 9, 2002). 
 327. 48 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 328. 89 F.3d 1031 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 329. Romberg, 48 F.3d at 454; Washington, 89 F.3d at 1043. 
 330. Ollis v. Hearthstone Homes, Inc., No. 8:05CV119, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39151, at 
*2 (D. Neb. June 12, 2006), aff’d, 495 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 331. Id. at *14-15.  
 332. Brandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 333. Id. at 1182. 
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sonable and did not even approach the seventeen-million-to-one ratio 
involved in Farrar.334    
Petrunich was one case in which a low damages request did not 
result in an award of fees. In that case, the plaintiff’s modest request 
for $150,000 in damages did not save his claim for attorney’s fees.335
Rejecting the plaintiff’s reliance on another case in which plaintiffs 
who sought $150,000 in damages were awarded fees, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff’s recovery of 0.00066% of what he requested 
was evidence that his victory was de minimis and that he was not en-
titled to fees under the first O’Connor factor.336
McBurrows v. Michigan Department of Transportation is another 
case in which a court compared the amount sought by the plaintiff to 
the amount she actually received and ultimately concluded that a fee 
award was inappropriate.337 In McBurrows, the court specifically 
noted that the plaintiff sought over $500,000 in damages against the 
defendant, yet she was awarded only nominal damages.338 As a result 
of this disparity, the court of appeals determined that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney’s fees to the plain-
tiff.339 Similarly, in Leggett v. Gold International, Inc., the court also 
denied a Title VII plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, basing its de-
cision primarily on the disparity between the amount the plaintiff 
sought in her complaint and the amount she was ultimately 
awarded.340 Although the plaintiff in Leggett was awarded more than 
nominal damages (she was awarded $5000 in punitive damages), the 
court noted that this sum paled in comparison to the amount for 
which she asked in her complaint, $3.5 million.341 As a result of this 
disparity, the court noted that “[the plaintiff’s] modest success in this 
                                                                                                                    
 334. Id. The court also distinguished this case from Farrar because it was not nearly as 
protracted as Farrar. Id. Although some of the cases described in this Section did award 
fees to the prevailing plaintiffs, the fact remains that when courts use Justice O’Connor’s 
first factor as the most important factor in deciding whether an award of attorney’s fees is 
appropriate, they almost always decline to award fees to a prevailing plaintiff who is 
awarded only nominal damages. 
 335. Petrunich v. Sun Bldg. Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 199, 207 (M.D. Pa. 2008), va-
cated by consent of the parties, No. 04-2234, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104154 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 
21, 2008). See also Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1996). In Briggs, the court 
weighed  
the first O’Connor factor against a fee award when the plaintiff sought $75,000 in compen-
satory damages, plus punitive damages, but was awarded only four dollars in nominal 
damages. Id.
 336. Petrunich, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 207. The other case upon which the plaintiff at-
tempted to rely was Buss v. Quigg, No. 01-CV-3908, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19324 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 9, 2002). 
 337. 159 F. App’x 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 338. Id.
 339. Id.
 340. No. CV205-136, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9081, at *3-4 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2007). 
 341. Id. at *1-3. 
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action does not warrant an award of attorneys’ fees.”342 Additionally, 
in Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court granted the plaintiff on-
ly 25% of the fees she requested, mostly because the $12,000 she was 
awarded after a trial was much less than the $500,000 (plus compen-
satory and punitive damages) her attorney indicated the claim was 
worth.343 Finally, in Bell v. Board of County Commissioners of Jeffer-
son County, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that a 
90% reduction in fees was appropriate because the plaintiff, who re-
quested what the Tenth Circuit referred to as an “extravagant and 
overreaching request” of $1.4 million, was awarded no damages.344   
 Although not all courts have reached the same conclusion with 
similar facts, a few points are clear regarding Justice O’Connor’s first 
Farrar factor. First, the discrepancy between the amount sought and 
the amount awarded is the most important of the three O’Connor fac-
tors.345 Second, the smaller the amount of damages a plaintiff re-
quests, the more likely he is to receive an award of attorney’s fees if 
he recovers only nominal damages. As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
who might be risk-averse would be well advised to ask for a small 
damage award in the complaint and at trial, knowing that if only 
nominal damages are awarded, these attorneys will have a better 
chance of recovering fees.346 This, of course, creates a dilemma for at-
torneys. Ethical attorneys will put their clients’ best interests ahead 
of their own and ask for the full value of their clients’ claims. Howev-
er, they will also be aware that if they are going to put forth the time 
and effort to represent a client in what could be lengthy litigation, they 
would like to receive fair compensation for that time and effort if the 
jury believes that, although the defendant violated the plaintiff’s 
rights, the plaintiff was entitled to only nominal damages.347 Even 
                                                                                                                    
 342. Id. at *4. The court in Leggett also gave a brief discussion of whether the plain-
tiff’s lawsuit accomplished anything other than “providing her with the moral satisfaction 
of having her rights vindicated in a federal court.” Id. at *3-4. See also Zeuner v. Rare Hos-
pitality Int’l, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (M.D.N.C. 2005). In Zeuner, the court denied 
the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees in part because of the disparity between  
the amount she sought (in excess of $2 million) and the nominal damages she was 
awarded. Id. See also the cases cited in Part III of this Article, where the courts denied at-
torney’s fee requests in part because of the difference between the amount sought and the 
amount awarded.  
 343. 469 F.3d 311, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 344. 451 F.3d 1097, 1100-01, 1104-05 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). According to the trial court’s opinion in Bell, because of an error with the jury instruc-
tions, the jury was not given the opportunity to award nominal damages. Bell v. Bd.  
of County Comm’rs, No. 03-2148-KHV, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2187, at *7 (D. Kan. Feb.  
15, 2005). 
 345. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 120-21 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 346. Of course, the attorney who does this potentially forfeits a big award, as many of 
these cases are contingency-fee cases.  
 347. Of course, some anti-discrimination statutes place caps on damages, which reduce 
the amount a plaintiff can recover. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006). However, with caps 
ranging from $50,000 to $300,000, the difference between a figure within this range and a 
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Judge Posner acknowledged in his Hyde opinion that civil rights plain-
tiffs who “aim[] small” have a better chance of obtaining an attorney’s 
fee award than plaintiffs who ask for higher damage awards.348
 Although the first O’Connor factor most likely serves the positive 
function of preventing attorneys from artificially inflating the value 
of their clients’ claims, it could also have the effect of attorneys inten-
tionally undervaluing their clients’ claims in an effort to maximize 
the likelihood of being awarded attorney’s fees if their clients win on-
ly nominal damages. Also, because nominal-damage awards will al-
ways result in a large discrepancy between the amount sought and 
the amount recovered, this factor almost always weighs against an 
award of attorney’s fees. As a result, placing so much emphasis on 
this factor should be reevaluated.  
B. Problems with Justice O’Connor’s Second Factor 
 One of the factors courts evaluate under Justice O’Connor’s three-
factor test from Farrar is the significance of the legal theory upon 
which the plaintiff prevailed.349 While there is currently a split of au-
thority on what exactly this factor was meant to address (the number 
of claims on which the plaintiff prevailed or the relative importance 
of the claims on which the plaintiff prevailed),350 courts should realize 
that a defendant’s violation of an individual’s civil rights is always
important. Regardless of whether the plaintiff proves one or several 
of these violations, and regardless of the amount of damages a jury 
places on those violations, the court should not require the plaintiff 
(or his attorney) to bear the cost of proving that a particular defen-
dant violated his rights.351
 If the courts interpret this second factor as meaning only whether 
the specific issue is an important one (which is very close to the third 
O’Connor factor from Farrar), courts should consider all civil rights 
violations important. As a result, plaintiffs who demonstrate a viola-
tion of these important rights should not be forced to bear the cost of 
proving such a violation, even if a court awards only nominal damag-
es. Some courts agree and stress the importance of civil rights viola-
tions, weighing this factor in favor of granting a fee award.352 One 
                                                                                                                    
one dollar nominal-damage award would most likely weigh against the plaintiff under the 
first O’Connor factor.  
 348. See Hyde v. Small, 123 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 349. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 350. See supra note 57. 
 351. In fact, the Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. noted that the purpose 
behind the fee-shifting statute in Title VII was to make sure that a plaintiff who demon-
strated that a defendant violated the law should not have to bear the cost of proving that 
violation. See 434 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1978). 
 352. See supra Parts IV and V. 
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such case was Buss v. Quigg.353 When analyzing the second O’Connor 
factor, the court in Buss evaluated both the importance of the legal 
issue on which the plaintiffs prevailed and the extent to which the 
plaintiffs prevailed.354 Regarding the first issue, the court relied on Su-
preme Court precedent and noted that the protection against unlawful 
entry by law enforcement is an important right and a finding that such 
a right was violated should weigh in favor of awarding fees.355 Specifi-
cally, the court found that “[t]he importance accorded the protection of 
the home from arbitrary entry by law enforcement personnel needs lit-
tle elaboration. I thus find it difficult to question the legal significance 
of [the] [p]laintiffs’ successful claim that [one of the defendants] unlaw-
fully entered their home on two separate occasions.”356     
 Other courts have also concluded that civil rights violations are 
sufficient to tip the scales in favor of awarding fees. For example, in 
Ollis, the court stated the following when addressing the second 
O’Connor factor: “the legal issues presented in this case, discrimina-
tory discharge based on religion and retaliation, are significant is-
sues.357 [The plaintiff] and other employees have a right to be free 
from religious discrimination and retaliation in the workplace.”358
Similarly, although ultimately denying the plaintiff’s request for at-
torney’s fees, the court in Petrunich did acknowledge the importance 
of the issue involved when it noted that “the right to a discrimina-
tion-free workplace is important.”359 Also, the court in Hare found 
that the hostile work environment claim on which the plaintiff pre-
vailed was an important issue, stating that “[v]indication of a Title 
VII right is significant, especially when ‘compared to the injury to a 
business interest alleged in Farrar.’ ”360 Therefore, some courts rec-
                                                                                                                    
 353. No. 01-CV-3908, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19324 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2002). 
 354. Id. at *24-27. 
 355. Id. at *25-26. The Supreme Court cases upon which the court relied were Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984), and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980). 
 356. Id. (citations omitted). The court then evaluated the extent of the plaintiffs’ victo-
ry, and although the plaintiffs did not prevail on a majority of their claims, the court still 
determined that this factor weighed in favor of awarding fees. Id. at *26-27. 
 357. Ollis v. Hearthstone Homes, Inc., No. 8:05CV119, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39151, at 
*15 (D. Neb. June 12, 2006). 
 358. Id. Clearly, the court was using the second O’Connor factor to evaluate the impor-
tance of the legal issues involved rather than the extent to which the plaintiff succeeded on 
the claims. 
 359. Petrunich v. Sun Bldg. Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 199, 208 (M.D. Pa. 2008), va-
cated by consent of the parties, No. 04-2234, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104154 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 
21, 2008). Even though it ultimately denied the plaintiff’s request for fees, the court also 
looked at the extent to which the plaintiff prevailed and concluded that because the plain-
tiff prevailed on four of the six claims, that factor weighed in favor of a fee award. Id. at 
208-09. 
 360. Hare v. Potter, 549 F. Supp. 2d 698, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Jones v. Lock-
hart, 29 F.3d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1994)). The court cited several other cases that emphasized 
the importance of vindicating civil rights. Specifically, the court cited Hashimoto v. Dalton,
118 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that hostile work environments are serious is-
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ognize that civil rights violations are significant, regardless of 
whether the violations result in a high damage award to a particular 
plaintiff. As a result, when a defendant is found to have violated one 
or more of these rights, the second O’Connor factor should weigh in 
favor of awarding fees. The court in Otero v. Colligan noted this when 
it stated that a victorious plaintiff should not “be required to bear the 
entire cost of battling [a defendant’s] unconstitutional practice.” 361
 This is especially true when looking at cases involving employ-
ment discrimination. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
the Supreme Court noted that the primary “evil” Congress intended 
to eradicate when enacting Title VII was intentional discrimination 
based on certain protected characteristics.362 By referring to discrimi-
nation as an “evil,” the Court was certainly sending a strong message 
regarding the importance of preventing intentional discrimination. 
When juries find that a defendant has violated either this statute or 
another anti-discrimination statute, certainly this factor should 
weigh in favor of awarding fees. 
 As the above Section has demonstrated, the second O’Connor fac-
tor, especially when interpreted as looking at the importance of the 
legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, should weigh in favor of 
awarding fees even when the plaintiff is awarded only nominal dam-
ages. All civil rights violations are important, and plaintiffs who 
demonstrate that the defendant violated these rights should not bear 
the cost of proving these violations. Similarly, the attorneys who put 
forth the time and effort to help prove these violations should not be 
denied compensation for the time they spent pursuing these merito-
rious, although not particularly lucrative, claims.   
C. Problems with Justice O’Connor’s Third Factor 
 The final factor courts apply when utilizing Justice O’Connor’s 
three-factor test from Farrar is whether the litigation accomplished a 
“public goal other than occupying the time and energy of counsel, 
court, and client.”363 This factor, however, ignores the fact that most 
plaintiffs are typically not motivated by making sure this type of vi-
olation does not happen to others; rather, they are usually more in-
terested in redressing a wrong that has occurred to them. Penalizing 
these plaintiffs simply because they were motivated by a desire to 
                                                                                                                    
sues); Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that cruel and unusual 
punishment was a more significant interest than the one involved in Farrar); and Cabrera 
v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 393 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that racial discrimination in housing 
is an important legal issue).  
 361. No. 3:99cv2378 (WIG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44001, at *10 (D. Conn. June  
28, 2006). 
 362. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv’s., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1998). 
 363. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 121-22 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
88 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:49 
seek redress for a personal wrong rather than by the desire to advo-
cate for the rights of others simply serves no purpose. In fact, Con-
gress wanted individuals to act as private attorneys general and vigi-
lantly pursue employers who violate anti-discrimination statutes.364
Requiring some public benefit to this type of litigation undermines 
this goal and decreases the likelihood that individuals and their at-
torneys will want to pursue these claims. 
 Although most courts deny attorney’s fees in cases involving no-
minal damages, as this Article has demonstrated, some courts award 
fees in these cases.365 These courts acknowledge the importance of 
civil rights litigation and that denying fees in these cases would deter 
potential plaintiffs from filing claims.366 Other courts have decided  
to award fees under the third O’Connor factor, finding that the  
specific plaintiff accomplished some public, rather than solely pri-
vate, benefit.367
Ollis was one case where the court concluded that the third 
O’Connor factor weighed in favor of awarding fees.368 The court found 
that the plaintiff’s lawsuit did serve a public purpose, stating that a 
civil rights plaintiff acts as a private attorney general, promoting 
rights Congress considers to be of the highest importance.369 The 
court in Ollis also noted with respect to the specifics of that particu-
lar case, “[b]ased on the outcome of this case, [the defendant] and 
other employers may well review and modify their policies concerning 
religious discrimination; therefore, an important public goal has been 
served.”370 The court therefore found both that civil rights litigation 
in general serves an important purpose and that the plaintiff’s law-
suit in that particular case also served a broader purpose as well.371
 Using similar logic, the court in Hill v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of 
Chicago, Inc., analyzed the third O’Connor factor and concluded that it 
weighed in favor of awarding fees.372 Although the court in Hill did not 
grant the plaintiff’s entire request for fees, it granted a significant fee 
award after the plaintiff prevailed in her Title VII gender discrimina-
                                                                                                                    
 364. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975); see also Ollis v. Hearth-
stone Homes, Inc., No. 8:05CV119, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39151, at *15 (D. Neb. June  
12, 2006). 
 365. See supra Parts IV and V. In the cases described in Part IV, the fee awards were 
at least somewhat close to what the plaintiffs requested. In the cases described in Part V, 
the courts awarded only a small percentage of what the plaintiffs requested. 
 366. See supra Parts IV and V. 
 367. See supra Parts IV and V. 
 368. Ollis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39151, at *1, 15-16. 
 369. Id. at *15.  
 370. Id. at *15-16. 
 371. See id.
 372. No. 01-T-063-S, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9526, at *20-21 (M.D. Ala. May 13, 2003). 
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tion lawsuit.373 The court made several statements regarding the im-
portance of civil rights litigation, including the following: 
Success in a civil rights case “cannot be valued solely in monetary 
terms.” . . . When determining the degree of success obtained by a 
civil rights plaintiff, a court must be careful not to place “undue em-
phasis on the modest money damages that were found by the jury” 
because successful civil rights actions vindicate a public interest.374
Continuing to address whether that case achieved a public goal, the 
court noted the following: 
Not only did [the plaintiff] vindicate one of her own civil rights, her 
suit vindicated the public’s interest in women being able to enjoy 
employment without facing discrimination based on their gender. 
As such, although [the plaintiff’s] award of attorney’s fees is great-
er in monetary terms than her damages award, the court finds 
that the fee award to be reasonable given that [the plaintiff] vindi-
cated a civil right important both to her personally and to society 
as a whole.375
Brandau is another example of a court finding a public goal was 
advanced by a private litigant’s civil rights suit.376 In Brandau, the 
plaintiff prevailed in the lower court on her hostile environment sex-
ual harassment claim, yet she was awarded only nominal damages.377
The lower court granted her fee request, and the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed.378 Although the plaintiff’s suit was purely personal, the court 
weighed the third O’Connor factor in favor of the plaintiff and, simi-
larly to the courts in Ollis and Hill, noted the importance of these 
cases, both personally and for the public as a whole.379 Specifically, 
when deciding that the third O’Connor factor weighed in favor of a 
fee award, the court noted that in addition to vindicating her person-
al rights, the plaintiff:  
put Kansas, or at least Wyandotte County, on notice that it should 
reform its sexual harassment policies and that it is proceeding at 
its peril if it declines to do so. These results—vindicating rights se-
cured by Title VII and providing a broad constitutional benefit to 
other employees of Wyandotte County—are in the interests of the 
public and are exactly what Congress intended to encourage under 
Title VII.380
                                                                                                                    
 373. Id. at *2. 
 374. Id. at *15 (quoting Villano v. Boynton Beach, 254 F.3d 1302, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 
2001)) (alteration in original). 
 375. Id. at *20. 
 376. Brandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 377. Id. at 1181. 
 378. Id. at 1181, 1183. 
 379. Id. at 1182-83. 
 380. Id. at 1183. 
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Thus, once again, a court recognized that vindicating a civil right, 
even when more personal than public, should satisfy the third 
O’Connor factor. 
 The court in Buss also weighed the third O’Connor factor and cor-
rectly concluded that it weighed in favor of awarding fees.381 After 
noting the deterrent effect the verdict would have on future police of-
ficers’ conduct,382 the court noted that the plaintiffs’ victory was 
“more than . . . ‘technical’ or ‘de minimis.’ ”383 Noting that many of 
these civil rights victories “cannot be readily cast in monetary terms,” 
the court focused on the purpose of these civil rights fee-shifting pro-
visions and observed that “[w]here law enforcement officers plainly 
violate constitutional rights, the availability of counsel should not be 
made to depend on the degree to which plaintiffs endure emotional 
harm.”384 The court added that “[t]o so hold is to patently disregard 
the well-established enforcement function of § 1988.”385 Concluding 
its discussion of the “public purpose” factor, the court quoted Judge 
Posner who, in a case involving a $500 award for false arrest, stated:  
The district court based its decision to award no fees on the small 
size of the verdict and the fact that the case broke no new ground 
in the law of police abuses. If these are sufficient grounds it means 
that routine police misconduct that, although unconstitutional, is 
neither harmful enough to support a large award of compensatory 
damages nor malicious enough to justify an award of punitive 
damages is, as a practical matter, beyond the reach of the law. It is 
impossible, unless there is an expectation of a fee award (and often 
not then), to interest a competent lawyer in bringing a suit in fed-
eral court to recover a small amount of damages unless the plain-
tiff is a rich person willing to finance the suit out of his own pocket 
rather than by means of a contingent-fee contract, the normal way 
in which tort suits are financed in this country. Yet the cumulative 
effect of petty violations of the Constitution arising out of the inte-
ractions between the police (and other public officers) and the  
citizenry on the values protected by the Constitution may not be 
petty, and if this is right then the mere fact that a suit does not  
result in a large award of damages or the breaking of new consti-
tutional ground is not a good ground for refusing to award any  
attorneys’ fees.386
 Finally, the court in Hare determined that the third O’Connor fac-
tor can weigh in favor of a fee award when a plaintiff files a Title VII 
                                                                                                                    
 381. Buss v. Quigg, No. 01-CV-3908, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19324, at *27-29 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 9, 2002). 
 382. Id. at *27-28. 
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lawsuit and is awarded only nominal damages.387 In fact, the Hare
court used strong language when noting that civil rights lawsuits, 
even those that are brought only by one person, can serve a public 
goal. Specifically, the court noted that “successful Title VII cases 
achieve an important public purpose.”388 The court then looked at 
Congressional intent and noted that “Congress intended a Title VII 
plaintiff to be the ‘chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate a poli-
cy that Congress considered the highest priority.’ ”389 After noting 
that the plaintiff’s victory required the employer to post a notice of 
the plaintiff’s victory and to provide additional training to its em-
ployees, the court observed that the verdict “vindicated [the plaintiff], 
provided a benefit to the [defendant’s] current and future employees, 
and was in the public’s interest.”390 The court then noted that the re-
sult in this case might also “deter and prevent future” Title VII viola-
tions.391 As a result, the court determined that the third O’Connor 
factor weighed in favor of a fee award.392   
 Although some opinions such as the ones described above deter-
mined that private lawsuits can, in fact, provide a public good, not all 
courts agree with that conclusion.393 For example, in Petrunich,
where the plaintiff lost his request for attorney’s fees in an ADEA 
claim, the court weighed the final O’Connor factor against the plain-
tiff.394 The court took a much more narrow view of this factor and 
noted that a case only “accomplishes a public purpose when it vindi-
cates the rights of others, creates new precedent, deters future depri-
                                                                                                                    
 387. Hare v. Potter, 549 F. Supp. 2d  698, 707-08 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 388. Id. at 707. The court in Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th 
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 392. Id. at 707-08. See also Barber, 254 F.3d at 1232 (finding that a public goal is 
served “if the plaintiff’s victory encourages attorneys to represent civil rights litigants, af-
firms an important right, puts the defendant on notice that it needs to improve, and/or 
provokes a change in the defendant’s conduct”). 
 393. In addition to the cases cited here, see supra Part III. 
 394. Petrunich v. Sun Bldg. Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 199, 201-02, 208-09 (M.D. Pa. 
2008), vacated by consent of the parties, No. 04-2234, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104154 (M.D. 
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vations, and/or provokes a change in the defendant’s behavior.”395 Of 
course, most civil rights cases typically do not accomplish these 
goals,396 and as a result, this factor would, according to the Petrunich
court’s reasoning, almost never weigh in favor of finding that a fee 
award is appropriate in a nominal-damage case.397 Applying this 
standard to the facts before it, the Petrunich court noted: 
Here, [the plaintiff]’s litigation did not advance a public purpose. 
His complaint asserted age discrimination claims that did not “re-
sult in ground-breaking conclusions of law” and will not “have a 
profound influence on the development of the law and on society.” 
. . . His complaint implicated an important interest—the right to a 
discrimination-free workplace—but [the plaintiff] sought to redress 
his own injuries without regard to other similarly situated em-
ployees. For instance, the complaint contained no allegations of  
a pattern or practice of age-based discrimination, nor a request  
for broad-based equitable relief. Because [the plaintiff]’s lawsuit 
failed to advance a public purpose, this factor weighs against a  
fee award.398
Thus, unlike the courts in Ollis, Hare, Brandau, and Hill, the court 
in Petrunich focused on authority suggesting that unless the litiga-
tion establishes a ground-breaking rule of law, vindicates others’ 
rights, deters future deprivations, or provokes a change in the defen-
dant’s behavior, the third O’Connor factor should weigh against an 
award of fees.399 This opinion, especially as it relates to cases brought 
by and on behalf of only one person, directly conflicts with the goal of 
                                                                                                                    
 395. Id. at 209 (citing Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 207-08 (4th Cir. 2005); Bar-
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 399. 625 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
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encouraging individuals to sue those whom they believe have violated 
their rights.400
 As argued above, the third O’Connor factor should always weigh 
in favor of awarding fees. Most victims of civil rights violations, along 
with most plaintiffs in general, bring lawsuits because they have 
been injured, not because they wish to establish new law or benefit 
the public as a whole. Civil rights plaintiffs should not be punished 
for doing so, and by not weighing the third O’Connor factor in favor of 
a plaintiff who wins only nominal damages, courts are penalizing in-
dividuals for wanting to vindicate their civil rights. 
D. Awarding Fees Will Not Provide a Windfall for Attorneys 
 One argument advanced by the Farrar court for denying attor-
ney’s fees to plaintiffs who are not awarded significant monetary 
damages is that awarding these fees would provide a windfall for the 
attorneys.401 Post-Farrar, other courts have also found this windfall 
argument persuasive. For example, the court in Spencer v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. relied on Farrar’s “windfall” argument and concluded 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees de-
spite being able to demonstrate a violation of the ADA.402 This rea-
soning, however, fails to take into account the fact that these cases 
are usually labor intensive, yet do not always result in high monetary 
awards to the plaintiffs.403 As a result, attorneys who devote hours  
of work to successfully demonstrate violations of their clients’  
rights should not be penalized for their efforts. If that occurs, it is 
likely that fewer attorneys will accept these cases, leaving these  
potential plaintiffs without representation or the ability to pursue 
meritorious claims.  
 Several of the opinions discussed in this Article demonstrate just 
how labor-intensive these civil rights cases can be. Awarding fees to 
attorneys who have devoted their time and effort proving civil rights 
violations would certainly not result in a windfall. The cases set out 
in the footnote below document the number of hours these attorneys 
sacrificed pursuing the vindication of their clients’ civil rights, rather 
than using that time to work on other cases for which they could 
have been receiving payment.404 These cases clearly demonstrate that 
                                                                                                                    
 400. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975). 
 401. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (quoting Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 
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it takes a lot of time to prove violations of their clients’ rights, and 
plaintiffs and their attorneys should not bear the cost of demonstrat-
ing a violation of law.   
 As this Section of the Article demonstrates, the “windfall” argu-
ment should not cause courts to disallow attorney’s fees in cases 
where only nominal damages are awarded. Attorneys who pursue 
these claims invest hundreds of hours in proving violations of law,405
and they should not be punished because a jury determined the 
plaintiff did not deserve more than nominal damages.   
E. Denying Fees Will Discourage Individuals From Seeking Redress 
For Civil Rights Violations 
 In addition to the fallacy of the “windfall” argument, another rea-
son courts should award attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who recover only 
nominal damages is to encourage these individuals and their attor-
neys to bring these lawsuits. Although the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission can file suit on behalf of plaintiffs in employ-
ment discrimination lawsuits,406 most employment discrimination 
and other civil rights lawsuits are brought by individuals on their 
own behalf. In fact, the Supreme Court noted that Congress intended 
individuals to pursue these claims vigorously and to act as private at-
torneys general in an attempt to encourage individuals to stop dis-
crimination within the workplace.407 However, if plaintiffs’ attorneys 
are going to be denied fees for the time and effort involved in proving 
civil rights violations, these individuals will be less likely to serve 
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 407. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).  
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this vital role. This will essentially allow employers and government 
officials to go unchecked with respect to their behavior. 
 Several courts, including the Supreme Court in Farrar, have ac-
knowledged this private attorney general theory in enforcing civil 
rights claims. For example, in her concurring opinion in Farrar, Jus-
tice O’Connor specifically noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “ensures the 
vindication of important rights, even when large sums of money are 
not at stake, by making attorney’s fees available under a private at-
torney general theory.”408 Several other courts since Farrar have also 
acknowledged the private attorney general theory, with some of these 
courts allowing fees, and some of them not providing for these fees. 
For example, the court in Buss recognized the private attorney gen-
eral theory and ultimately awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs.409
Additionally, the court in Ollis noted that a civil rights plaintiff act-
ing as a private attorney general promotes rights Congress considers 
to be of the highest importance.410 Similarly, the court in Picou also 
cited Justice O’Connor’s statements regarding the purpose of the civil 
rights fee-shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the private attorney 
general theory.411
 Thus, even when large sums of money are not at stake—which is 
often the case with civil rights cases—at least some courts agree that 
individuals should be encouraged to pursue these claims under the 
private attorney general theory; however, if courts disallow attor-
ney’s fees for plaintiffs who are able to prove a defendant’s wrong-
doing but are awarded only nominal damages, individuals and their 
potential attorneys will be less likely to pursue these claims.412
Courts that deny attorney’s fees to these plaintiffs are doing the ex-
act opposite of what these fee-shifting statutes were intended to ac-
complish—encouraging individual plaintiffs to pursue claims against 
defendants who violate their rights.413 As a result, the Court should 
revisit Farrar and determine that attorney’s fee awards are appro-
priate when a plaintiff can demonstrate a civil rights violation re-
gardless of the amount of damages he is awarded. 
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F. Allowing Attorney’s Fees Will Further Congressional Intent 
 By granting attorney’s fees in nominal-damage cases, courts 
would further Congress’s goal of encouraging victims of civil rights 
violations to pursue their claims. Following this reasoning, some 
courts have awarded fees in these nominal-damage cases.414
 One case that addressed the legislative history behind 42 U.S.C. § 
1988 was the previously discussed case of Buss v. Quigg.415 In ad-
dressing whether attorney’s fees were warranted, the court consi-
dered the legislative history behind 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and observed 
that in enacting this fee-shifting statute, Congress “sought to narrow 
the disparity in legal representation and resources between opposing 
parties in civil rights cases, particularly where . . . the defendant is a 
public official ‘with substantial resources available to [him] through 
funds in the common treasury, including the taxes paid by the plain-
tiffs themselves.’ ”416 In citing Supreme Court precedent addressing 
the relevant legislative history, the court in Buss also noted that “[i]n 
enacting § 1988, Congress determined that ‘the public as a whole has 
an interest in the vindication of the rights conferred by the statutes 
enumerated in § 1988, over and above the value of a civil rights re-
medy to a particular plaintiff.’ ”417 In order to achieve this goal, “Con-
gress sought to make fees available both to properly compensate 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and to serve a private enforcement function.”418
 In addition to quoting the Senate Report on this issue, the court in 
Buss also quoted the House Report, which noted the following:  
[w]hile damages are theoretically available under the statutes cov-
ered by [§ 1988], it should be observed that, in some cases, immun-
ity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, 
preclude or severely limit the damage remedy. Consequently, 
awarding counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is 
particularly important and necessary if Federal civil and constitu-
tional rights are to be adequately protected.419
Thus, at least according to Buss, attorney’s fee awards can be appro-
priate in cases where only nominal damages are awarded.420
 Another case that addressed the purpose behind these fee-shifting 
statutes was Hare v. Potter.421 In that case, the court noted that the 
purpose behind fee-shifting statutes is to encourage victims of dis-
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crimination to “seek judicial relief,” and “[i]f successful plaintiffs 
were routinely forced to bear their own attorney[’s] fees, few ag-
grieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest 
by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.”422 Finally, 
the court in Otero v. Colligan made the keen observation that 
“[a]ttorney’s fees are authorized by § 1988 for prevailing civil rights 
plaintiffs in order ‘to encourage the bringing of meritorious civil 
rights claims which might otherwise be abandoned because of the fi-
nancial imperatives surrounding the hiring of competent counsel.’ ”423
These statements clearly demonstrate congressional desire to en-
courage civil rights lawsuits.  
 Although Justice O’Connor expressed her opinion that denying 
fees in nominal-damage cases was consistent with the history behind 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, she relied partially on the fact that Congress made 
these awards discretionary rather than mandatory.424 While Justice 
O’Connor’s use of this fact is reasonable, another possibility for giv-
ing courts the discretion to award fees was to prevent prevailing de-
fendants from seeking attorney’s fees.425 Although Justice O’Connor’s 
other points regarding legislative history are certainly well-taken, 
she still ignores the fact that the factors she articulated in Farrar
will (1) almost always result in no fee award, or a significantly re-
duced fee award, because of the large difference between the amount 
usually sought in civil rights lawsuits and the usual nominal-damage 
award; (2) diminish the importance of civil rights violations; and (3) 
ignore the fact that most civil rights plaintiffs file suit for the purpose 
of redressing individual wrongs rather than to “vindicate[] the rights 
of others, create[] new legal precedent, deter[] future deprivations, 
and/or provoke[] a change in the defendant’s behavior.”426
 Therefore, although there is some legislative history to support 
the denial of attorney’s fees in cases in which plaintiffs are awarded 
only nominal damages,427 the overall purpose behind these fee-
shifting statutes is frustrated when these prevailing parties are not 
entitled to recover their attorney’s fees. The purpose of these statutes 
is to encourage victims of civil rights violations to pursue these 
                                                                                                                    
 422. Id. at 701-02 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400,  
402 (1968)). 
 423. No. 3:99cv2378 (WIG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44001, at *10 (D. Conn. June 28, 
2006) (quoting Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 424. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 119 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 425. As was noted earlier, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Christiansburg 
Garment Co., while prevailing plaintiffs are typically entitled to a fee award, prevailing de-
fendants are entitled to those awards only in very limited circumstances. 434 U.S. 412, 
417, 421 (1978).  
 426. Petrunich v. Sun Bldg. Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 199, 209 (M.D. Pa. 2008), va-
cated by consent of the parties, No. 04-2234, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104154 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 
21, 2008). 
 427. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 118-21 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
98 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:49 
claims, even when the amount of money at stake is not excessive.428
By denying fees in these cases, the courts will discourage individuals 
and their attorneys from bringing potentially meritorious lawsuits, 
which is the exact opposite of what Congress wanted when it enacted 
these various fee-shifting statutes. As the court in Otero properly 
noted, “[d]eterring meritorious lawsuits . . . because they offer a 
small likelihood of a significant money judgment presents as grave a 
danger to our legal system as frivolous litigation.”429 As a result, the 
Court should rethink its position in Farrar.
VII.   CONCLUSION
 While the Court’s decision in Farrar clarified that plaintiffs who 
win nominal damages are prevailing parties for purposes of the  
fee-shifting provisions in various civil rights statutes, the Court’s 
opinion and Justice O’Connor’s three-factor test from her concurring 
opinion make it unlikely that these plaintiffs will recover their attor-
ney’s fees despite the fact they are able to prove a defendant violated 
their rights.  
 The first O’Connor factor, and the most important one, is the dif-
ference between the amount sought and the amount recovered, and it 
will almost always weigh against an award of fees. This is because 
most nominal-damage awards are, by definition, extremely small, 
while civil rights plaintiffs typically request a substantial amount of 
damages. As a result, a one-dollar award will almost always cause a 
large disparity between the amount sought by the plaintiff and the 
amount awarded by the court. 
 The second O’Connor factor, and the one many courts consider the 
least important, is the significance of the legal issue upon which the 
plaintiff prevailed. While some courts look at this factor as evaluat-
ing the importance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed 
(which is similar to the third O’Connor factor), other courts look at 
the number of claims on which the plaintiff succeeded. This Article 
has argued that all civil rights claims are important, and as a result, 
a plaintiff who can establish a violation of his rights should be en-
titled to a fee award, despite being awarded only nominal damages.430
 Finally, the third factor from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Farrar
evaluates whether the litigation served some public good, or whether 
it merely wasted the court’s and counsel’s time. While Justice 
                                                                                                                    
 428. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).   
 429. Otero v. Colligan, No. 3:99cv2378 (WIG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44001, at *10-11 
(D. Conn. June 28, 2006) (quoting Koopman v. Water Dist. No. 1, 41 F.3d 1417, 1421 (10th 
Cir. 1994)). 
 430. As I noted earlier, if courts want to analyze this factor by looking at the number of 
successful claims and the number of unsuccessful claims, I do not oppose awarding fees as-
sociated only with the successful claims. 
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O’Connor and some courts seem to dismiss the importance of civil 
rights violations, courts should realize all civil rights suits in which a 
plaintiff proves a civil rights violation do more than waste time, even 
if a plaintiff is awarded only nominal damages. 
 As is clear from the previous analysis of the O’Connor factors from 
Farrar, the Court should revisit Farrar and decide that even in cases 
where only nominal damages are awarded, plaintiffs should typically 
be entitled to recover their attorney’s fees.431 In addition to the flaws 
inherent in Justice O’Connor’s three-factor test, there are several 
reasons for changing the status quo. (1) Failing to award attorney’s 
fees in nominal-damage cases will deter plaintiffs and their attorneys 
from bringing meritorious, yet perhaps not particularly lucrative, 
lawsuits; (2) using Justice O’Connor’s three-factor test could cause 
attorneys to undervalue their clients’ claims and perhaps create con-
flicts of interest when attorneys must decide the amount of damages 
to request from a jury; (3) granting attorney’s fees in nominal-
damage cases will not create a windfall for attorneys who are able to 
prove civil rights violations; and (4) denying attorney’s fees in no-
minal-damage cases will frustrate congressional intent behind the 
fee-shifting provisions in various civil rights statutes.   
 Therefore, in order to encourage individuals to enforce their 
rights, the Court should revisit the portion of the Farrar opinion that 
addresses the propriety of attorney’s fee awards in nominal-damage 
cases and conclude that there should be a presumption in favor of 
awarding fees to a victorious plaintiff’s attorney once the plaintiff es-
tablishes himself as a prevailing party. This will encourage victims of 
civil rights violations to bring these claims, and it will allow them to 
retain competent counsel to help them pursue those who violate 
these important rights.  
                                                                                                                    
 431. Although I have not yet raised this possibility, perhaps the presumption in favor 
of an attorney’s fee award should prevail unless the defendant can demonstrate that the 
lawsuit was brought for a frivolous purpose and not in order to seek redress for a wrong. 
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